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The Structure of Judicial Opinions
John Leubsdorft
A judicial opinion tells many stories and speaks with many
voices. It is less a single and anonymous utterance of the law
than a condensed quarrel, less a line than a knot. It is pre-
cisely that complexity that enables it to absorb and seek to re-
solve a variety of conflicts: conflicts between parties, between
social interests, between judges, between justice in the individ-
ual case and general rules of law. Its stories and voices also
help it to lodge in a reader's mind, carrying the conflicts from
which it springs, disseminating its effort to resolve them, while
opening different directions for future growth.
These characteristics of judicial opinions are not happen-
stance. They are defining features of a special and unstudied
literary genre. An opinion works in differing but related ways.
Like a novel, it portrays a human conflict. Like a letter, it in-
tervenes in the conflict it portrays. Like a treatise, it gives a
systematic analysis meant to be applicable to many situations.
Like a work of history or criticism, it compares disputes that
have occurred over the years and analyzes what past authors
have proposed. Like a dialogue, it embraces clashing ap-
proaches to the conflict before the court. Like a script or com-
puter program, it gives instructions to those who act and de-
cide. Like an oration, it seeks to persuade.
Only a complex structure can fulfill these various func-
tions. Learning to be a lawyer requires one to develop at least
an implicit understanding of this structure by learning to read
an opinion as an opinion, rather than as some other kind of
composition. Law students are not the only ones tempted to
read a court's opinion as an essay on the law, detached from its
facts and procedural context, or as a reliable description of the
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facts or law or history it recites, or as an argument for the re-
sult the author prefers. Of course, an opinion could contain any
of these, but not always, and not always in the way uninformed
reading might suggest. The way any of them operates is inevi-
tably affected by its appearing as part of an opinion. Consider-
ing the structure of opinions in a more explicit and detailed
way, we may understand them better.
This Essay seeks to show how opinions weave together dif-
ferent stories and voices. An opinion may tell the story of the
dispute in question, of proceedings in court, of what did not ac-
tually happen but might have happened or could happen in the
future, of comparable past cases, or of changes in law or society.
Each story forms a background against which the reader may
appraise the decision.
Many voices, heard more or less directly, may tell or dis-
cuss those stories: the author of the opinion, concurrers and
dissenters, trial judges, judges who wrote in other cases, legis-
latures and legislators, lawyers, and sometimes even litigants
and witnesses. It would be a wild overstatement to describe
the typical judicial opinion, as Bakhtin describes Dostoevsky's
novels, as a "plurality of independent and unmerged voices and
consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices."1
Often, indeed, the opinion's author succeeds in swallowing
other voices, which can be heard, if at all, only like the duck
quacking from the wolfs stomach in another Russian work, Pe-
ter and the Wolf.2 Still, a judicial opinion offers real opportuni-
ties for dialogue.
The interweaving of stories and voices constitutes the
structure of a judicial opinion, or at least that part of it dis-
cussed here. By structure, I do not mean the order in which an
opinion's components appear. Opinions do tend to follow a
standard order-statement of the procedural posture, exposi-
tion of relevant facts, discussion of legal issues, and disposition
of the case. This order is, of course, appropriate to the opinion's
functions, just as the somewhat similar order of a classical fo-
rensic oration or modern brief serves its function of persua-
sion.3 Yet judges often change the usual order on grounds of
1. MIKHAiL BAHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S PoETIcs 6 (Caryl
Emerson trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1929).
2. SERGEI PROKOFIEV, PETER AND THE WOLF (Maria Carlson trans., Vi-
king Press 1st ed. 1982) (1936).
3. See FED. R. APP. P. 28; QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA III, at ix
(H.E. Butler trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (written in the first century
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convenience or style, for example, by postponing a statement of
facts to the discussion of the legal issue to which those facts be-
long.
Some changes of order-such as disclosing at the outset the
court's legal conclusions or disposition of the case-would have
an enormous impact in another genre. A fictional narrative
that discloses on its first page what will ultimately become of
its characters is radically different from one reserving that in-
formation. 4 This remains true, in some respects, even for a sec-
ond reading by a reader who already knows the outcome. Be-
cause narratives depend so much on suspense and
development, disclosing the plot's outcome tends to make both
author and reader shift the focus of the work to some kind of
suspense and development other than the plot, such as the ef-
fort to understand what we already know to have happened.
Judicial opinions rarely rely much on suspense, so their order
of presentation is not crucial in the same way.
What counts in opinions is trying to organize a variety of
quarreling claims into a resolution satisfactory both for the
dispute before the court and for the law. The structure of an
opinion is therefore, for my purposes, composed of its stories
and voices and their relationships.
The interweaving of different and sometimes conflicting
stories and voices can make judicial opinions quite different
from the model of impersonal, monologic, unquestioning decla-
ration to which their authors, in the view of some, aspire.5
Perhaps legal scholars have been too willing to accept a literary
view of law as mechanical and repressive without questioning
literature's own claims to insight and perspective. Law and lit-
erature are competitors as well as partners. 6 Even Robert
A.D.).
4. See, e.g., FORD MADOX FORD, THE GOOD SOLDIER (Albert & Charles
Boni, Inc. 1927) (1915) (utilizing a narrator who discloses much of the story
immediately, although readers understand more as he proceeds); JOHN
MILTON, PARADISE LOST (Northrop Frye ed., Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1960)
(1667) (summarizing in the opening lines the plot, which the reader is as-
sumed to know in any event); A.B. YEHOSHUA, MR. MANI (Hillel Halkin trans.,
Doubleday 1992) (1989) (in which the story unfolds in reverse chronological
order).
5. See Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990); Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judi-
cial Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAw 187,
188 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric
and its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1561-63 (1990).
6. See, e.g., HARRIET MURAV, RUSSIA'S LEGAL FICTIONS 1-7 (1998); Tony
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Cover and Shoshana Felman, both of whom portray law as a
scene of conflict, may overstate the extent to which courts suc-
ceed in bridging or suppressing that conflict.7
Some opinions approach the supposed ideal more closely
than others. Yet there are ways of opening up even those writ-
ten in the terse, anonymous Continental style.8 Although
judges may hope to issue unanswerable opinions, who today
would espouse a stylistic ideal of impassive impersonality,
when we all know that opinions are written by human judges
about human problems?9 Better that an opinion should show
the problems and contexts to which its author responds. The
form of opinions-at least Anglo-American appellate opinions,
with their tension between stories and voices-is more suited to
doing that than to fostering an illusion that the disembodied
voice of logic is speaking. Indeed, the form, by acknowledging
that the court chooses among competing views, might be said to
make opinions self-deconstructing in ways much like those al-
leged of literary fiction. 10
By tracing the stories and voices of judicial opinions, I hope
to be more specific than some of those who routinely describe
law as some sort of narrative. 11 What is important is just what
sort of narrative an opinion is-or rather, what sorts of narra-
tive, for each opinion contains several interacting narratives-
and what the nature of these narratives implies about what
judges are doing and how readers are reacting. Likewise, I
Sharpe, (Per)versions of Law in Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE 91 (Mi-
chael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., 1999).
7. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 44-60 (1983); Shoshana Felman, Forms of Judicial Blindness: Trau-
matic Narratives and Legal Repetitions, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW
25 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999).
8. See, e.g., Mitchel de S.-O.-rE. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits: Judi-
cial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1343-1402
(1995). That is true even of legislation, which would seem the epitome of
monologic assertion. See John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40
STAN. L. REV. 181, 198-200 (1987).
9. James Boyd White develops a view similar to that in the text in works
including JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM (1990).
10. See PAUL DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC
OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM 17-18, 135-40 (2d ed. rev. 1983). One could,
however, argue that opinions need deconstruction to undermine their claims to
be free of fiction. From that point of view, this Essay could be considered to
attempt that deconstruction.
11. For perceptive criticism of this practice, see Jane B. Baron & Julia
Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1997).
450 [Vol. 86:447
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hope to explore regions that rhetorical analyses of opinions
have not reached. Because these analyses stress the style and
imagery of opinions rather than their structure, they tend to
show how the language of opinions can pull the wool over the
eyes of their readers, and sometimes their writers as wel1 2-a
good thing to know, but one that may distract attention from
more central effects. After all, most opinions are not suffi-
ciently coherent to make their imagery or style very revealing.
All opinions, however, even those written by average judges or
average clerks on average days, must incorporate at least some
of the stories and voices I will describe. And anyone writing a
judicial opinion must somehow use or misuse the possibilities
its structure evokes and the expectations that help structure its
readers' responses.
Does exploring the structure of opinions have any use?
Understanding the legal process is usually helpful, and this Es-
say will suggest some practical consequences of the structure of
judicial opinions. I confess, however, that I am writing this Es-
say primarily because seeing opinions in a new light and ex-
ploring their complexity interests me, and in the hope that this
will also prove interesting to others. The judicial opinion, de-
spite its familiarity and the dullness of many of its exemplars,
turns out to be an unexpectedly complicated and subtle genre,
comparable in these respects to more traditional literary gen-
res. Just as we understand classical music better if we know
something about the possibilities of sonata form, considering
the structure of judicial opinions can help us understand how a
particular author has shaped a particular opinion.
12. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 266-72 (rev. ed. 1998)
(unmasking Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905)); Sherry F. Colb, Words That Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Re-
sponses to Fetus-Envy?, 72 B.U. L. REV. 101, 107-39 (1992) (unmasking several
opinions); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Imposition, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1025, 1029-58 (1994) (unmasking conservative opinions' strategies for
delegitimizing those who seek change); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narra-
tives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 389-413 (1989) (unmasking Justice Scalia's opinion
in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), while praising
Justice Marshall's); Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical
Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1813-32 (1993) (unmask-
ing Justice White's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). For a
discussion of metaphors and other figures of speech in First Amendment
cases, see HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS
(1992).
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I. STORIES
A single opinion can contain a number of stories. Each
story imposes a requirement of narrative coherence: The result
of the case should fit naturally into the story. The opinion's au-
thor can emphasize one story rather than another and can tell
each kind of story in different ways. Like other constraints on
judges, constraints of narrative are therefore flexible.
A. WHAT HAPPENED
1. The Significance of a Statement of Facts
A trier of fact need not set forth the facts out of which a
dispute arises. Civil juries do not usually do so-much to the
shock of some foreign courtsl 3-and, in some states, neither do
trial judges deciding civil cases.14 Criminal trials do not lead to
written findings by either juries or judges. Even on the appel-
late level, Ohio attempted to reduce the operative portion of
opinions to the syllabus,15 and many of the facts of a French
Court of Cassation case often can be discovered only if someone
has published a note on the court's decision.1 6 Indeed, recent
13. See Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., LG Berlin, Recht der Internationalen
Wirtschaft [RIW], 35 (1989), 988, translated in ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 440 (1993) (declining to enforce
a Massachusetts judgment because of a lack of factual findings and other de-
fects). But see FED. R. CIv. P. 49 (allowing but not requiring special verdicts
and interrogatories to a jury).
14. John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579,
630 (1984) (criticizing the absence of a finding requirement).
15. See State v. Hauser, 131 N.E. 66, 67 (Ohio 1920) (criticizing-in the
opinion but not the syllabus-reliance on opinions rather than syllabi); KARL
N. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 97-99
(1960) (discussing the collapse of this effort). Similarly, compare Corbin v.
Wilkinson, 52 P.2d 45, 47 & syll. 4 (Okla. 1935), in which the court rejected
dictum of a previous case because not included in the syllabus, with Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. McInnis, 409 P.2d 355, 359 & syll. 2 (Okla. 1965), in which the
court used facts in a previous case's opinion to construe its syllabus. See Un-
ion Underwear Co. v. Aide, 159 S.E.2d 217, 221 (W. Va. 1967) (discussing the
status of the syllabus).
16. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened
Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 67, 87-88 (2001). See generally James Boyd White,
What's an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995) (discussing the uses of
opinions).
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scholarship suggests that even Hammurabi's Code, long taken
for legislation, was intended as a collection of abstracts of the
King's decisions, published as a sort of treatise on justice for
the guidance of other judges. 17
The incorporation of a full statement of facts into Anglo-
American opinions is a relatively recent development that may
well be related to the rise of the English novel in the eighteenth
century-one more link between judicial opinions and litera-
ture. Reported opinions have not always contained a statement
of facts. Even after judicial reporters started attempting to
transcribe the actual words of judges, they often stated the
facts on their own authority, before turning to the lawyers' ar-
guments and the court's decision. 18 Although sometimes noting
that the judge had stated the facts while delivering his opinion,
the reporter apparently felt no need to include that statement
as part of the opinion.19 Full judicial statements of facts be-
came common only with the arrival of the nineteenth century.20
Meanwhile, the same sort of particularized narration of a series
of events found in a statement of facts had also become a defin-
ing feature of the English novel, as well as of other new genres:
news reporting, crime stories, travel literature, and the modern
biography.21 These new forms, which may have influenced the
development of the judicial statement of facts, themselves re-
flected a new cultural emphasis on facts and evidence to which
17. JEAN BOTT9RO, MESOPOTAMIA: WRITING, REASONING, AND THE GODS
156-84 (Zainab Bahrani & Marc Van De Mieroop trans., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1992) (1987).
18. E.g., Gwynne v. Heaton, 28 Eng. Rep. 949 (Ch. 1778); Hamilton v.
Mendez, 96 Eng. Rep. 154 (MB. 1761); John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and
the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 576-78 (1993). On the
development of judicial reporting, see infra Part IlIA.
19. E.g., Alexander v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 370 (1808);
King v. Corporation of Bath, 104 Eng. Rep. 736 (K.B. 1811); Muckleston v.
Brown, 31 Eng. Rep. 934 (Ch. 1801).
20. E.g., Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808); Oliver v. Oliver,
161 Eng. Rep. 581 (Consistory Ct. of London 1801) (possibly reflecting the
court's civil law procedure); Dean of York v. Middleborough, 148 Eng. Rep. 888
(Ex. Ch. 1828). Fuller development of this theme would require differentiat-
ing the various ways in which factual findings or allegations could be brought
before appellate courts under the old procedural systems.
21. E.g., LENNARD J. DAVIS, FACTUAL FICTIONS: THE ORIGINS OF THE
ENGLISH NOVEL (1983); J. PAUL HUNTER, BEFORE NOVELS: THE CULTURAL
CONTEXTfS OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH FICTION (1990); MICHAEL
MCKEON, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH NOVEL 1600-1740, at 1-128 (1987);
IAN WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL (1967).
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English legal practice may have contributed. 22
Although, as we will see, a narrative of the facts has the
same elements as other narratives,23 it differs in many ways
from literary fiction. This is because its functions differ from
those of fiction. Recounting the facts provides some assurance
to litigants and their lawyers that the judge delivering the
opinion knows what the dispute is about. It allows readers to
appraise the adequacy of the court's resolution of that dispute,
and allows higher courts to consider challenges to the judge's
factual assumptions. It permits later readers to consider what
the court says in the light of the factual situation it confronted,
so that court rulings may be understood, limited to their facts,
or extended. It provides an illustrative fact pattern, not always
a typical one, against which formulations of the law may be
tested. This last function resembles the use of literature as a
storehouse for models of human behavior.
The story form in either law or literature, useful though it
may be, subtly affects the responses of both narrators and
readers by invoking assumptions imbedded in story-telling. It
is expected, for example, that the events of a story will be re-
lated to each other, not randomly thrown together. Their rela-
tionship will involve development through time, usually in a
way in which earlier events cause later ones. The relationship
is also ethical. Readers feel satisfied when the end of a story is
a fitting resolution of what has gone before, but perceive an un-
fitting resolution as implausible (depending on the details), sa-
tirical, or absurdist (although even satiric and absurdist fic-
tions tend to develop according to a logic of some kind24).
Likewise, a story almost always has living protagonists, whose
acts have intentions and consequences, and who are subject to
ethical judgment. A conventional story is also limited and self-
sufficient: It has a beginning and an end,25 and its contents
22. See, e.g., BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, A CULTURE OF FACT: ENGLAND, 1550-
1720 (2000); ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS: NARRATIVE AND
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND (1992).
23. For a survey of these elements, see MIEKE BAL, NARRATOLOGY:
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF NARRATIVE (Christine van Boheemen
trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 1985) (1978).
24. E.g., EUGbNE IONESCO, RHINOCEROS AND OTHER PLAYS (Derek Proux
trans., Grove Press, Inc. 1960) (1960); EVELYN WAUGH, DECLINE AND FALL
(Little, Brown & Co. 1949) (1928).
25. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW
152-53 (2000) (observing that lawyers may choose, to some extent, how far
back to trace their stories). This book includes many illuminating insights
[Vol. 86:447
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should suffice to explain what happens in it. Really believing
that everything is related to everything else would make it
hard to write any story other than a complete history of the
universe.26
These various assumptions are widespread in our society,
and lawyers usually take them for granted. That is one reason
we use stories so much in legal opinions as well as in many
other kinds of writing.27 Indeed, it may be impossible for hu-
mans to understand a human's behavior except as part of a
story.
The law's use of stories not only helps keep the assump-
tions of story-telling alive28 but is deeply related to legal
thought. Lawyers and judges, for example, tend to resist im-
posing liability based on a mere statistical correlation between
what the evidence describes and the defendant's characteris-
tics, preferring even unreliable eyewitness evidence that a par-
ticular defendant was seen committing the crime or tort-in
other words, a story.29 It has been claimed that
in the development of the capacity to assimilate "stories" and to tell
them, ... the child also learns what it is to be that creature that.., is
capable of making promises... and of linking his end to his begin-
ning in such a way as to attest to an "integrity" which every individ-
ual must be supposed to possess if he is to become a "subject" of (any)
system of law, morality, or propriety. 30
In any event, it is almost impossible for members of our le-
into legal story-telling.
26. For a sketch of a legal system presupposing that causes and conse-
quences extend beyond a party's present life, see REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH,
THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TIBET (1995).
27. E.g., HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (1973) (explaining narrative techniques
used in historical writing); STEVEN MARCUS, REPRESENTATIONS: ESSAYS ON
LITERATURE AND SOCIETY 247-310 (1954) (explaining narrative techniques
used in case history by Freud); NARRATIVE IN CULTURE: THE USES OF
STORYTELLING IN THE SCIENCES, PHILOSOPHY, AND LITERATURE (Cristopher
Nash ed., 1990).
28. AMSTERDAM1 & BRUNER, supra note 25, at 140-42.
29. See, e.g., Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).
For some of the noteworthy scholarly literature on this subject, see Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 48 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982), and Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts:
Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence
and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247 (1990).
30. HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE
AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 36 (1987) (ascribing this claim to Roland
Barthes).
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gal culture to discuss a legal issue without connecting it to
some story, real or hypothetical, whether that story is an ex-
ample of circumstances in which the issue arises or a legal his-
tory of how the issue came to exist or a description of an imag-
ined debate. Even when one court certifies an issue of law for
decision by another court, there is usually an accompanying
factual narrative. 31
2. The Nature of the Story
The story a statement of facts recites is usually of a special
sort, a species of moral tale. The author of such a judicial tale
may have two prime concerns: to explore who did what, and to
attribute legal (but also moral) responsibility. These may also
be concerns of literature, which indeed has long resorted to de-
pictions of trials in order to portray the search for truth32 and
moral judgment. 33 Unlike most literary moral tales, however,
those that judges tell in opinions are almost entirely retrospec-
tive. The events in dispute have already happened, and are be-
ing reviewed to educe a final judgment about them, albeit one
that may lead to prospective relief.
Literary narrators, by contrast, even when they position
themselves after the events they describe, often try to keep
readers in suspense. 34 The judgments that fictions suggest are
usually meant for readers still facing similar problems and
choices, for example, the young women that Jane Austen con-
templated as readers. Judicial authors may also hope to influ-
ence future behavior-and sometimes with stronger warrant
than novelists-but more through the sanctions they decree
and the rules they lay down than through reflection by future
actors on the misadventures of past Palsgrafs or Marburys.
To the extent that judges seek to grant relief shaping the
future, they resemble less authors of fiction than participants
in psychoanalysis, who similarly tell and retell the past in or-
31. E.g., Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 181 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1999).
32. E.g., 1 Kings 3 (judgment of Solomon); Daniel 13 (apocrypha)
(Susanna and the Elders). For the influence of such Biblical trial narratives
on procedural law, see generally R.H. Helmholz, The Bible in the Service of the
Canon Law, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1557 (1995).
33. AESCHYLUS, THE EUMENIDES, in AESCHYLUS: THE ORESTEIA 97
(Douglas Young trans., Univ. of Okla. Press 1974) (458 B.C.) (the trial of Ores-
tes).
34. E.g., JOSEPH CoNRAD, LORD JIM (1921).
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der to reconstruct and resolve it. 35 Both projects are subject to
evidentiary restrictions: Judges follow the law of evidence, and
analysis limits itself to the analysand's own memories and
thoughts. Both appraise the evidentiary material carefully and
critically, although analysands (and analysts as well) are en-
couraged to introspection and self-interrogation while judges
are more likely to direct suspicion at witnesses than at their
own prepossessions. (Hence Jerome Frank's proposal that all
judges should be psychoanalyzed.3 6) Psychoanalysis, ulti-
mately, is more oriented to the future than law: It looks to the
past mainly to improve the future, and often relies less on the
analysand's memories than on his or her present interactions
with the analyst and others.37 Law is more concerned with re-
dressing the past, and more openly uses moral and judgmental
narratives.
The moral tale an opinion tells is likely to be nuanced and
bittersweet. Normally, it will involve two characters in colli-
sion, which rules out the kind of story that shows how relation-
ships and influences pervade a social milieu 38 as well as the
rarer story of one person's inner development. 39 Rarely will ei-
ther party be wholly in the right, if only because such simple
cases are less likely to result in opinions. Often, good has not
triumphed in the real world-the civil plaintiff has been victim-
ized, the criminal defendant has accomplished his bad aim-
and only the court, setting aside its role of narrator to assume
that of deus ex machina, can begin to redress the balance. Un-
fortunately, all a court can do is hand out money and punish-
ments, which do not really heal the harm.40 Sometimes, it re-
35. See Roy Schafer, Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue, in ON
NARRATIVE 25 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981).
36. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH & REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 247-50 (1949); see John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge
Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 247-52 (1987).
37. DONALD P. SPENCE, NARRATIVE TRUTH AND HISTORICAL TRUTH:
MEANING AND INTERPRETATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS (1982).
38. E.g., ANTHONY POWELL, A DANCE TO THE MUSIC OF TIME (1975);
MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST (C.K. Scott Moncrieff &
Terence Kilmartin trans., Chatto & Windus 1982) (originally published in
eight parts, 1913-1927).
39. E.g., HERMANN BROCH, THE DEATH OF VIRGIL (Jean Starr Unter-
meyer trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1977) (1965) (recounting an author's
death in another German work); THOMAS MANN, DEATH IN VENICE (Kenneth
Burke trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1973) (1912) (illustrating the central char-
acter's relationship, which exists mainly in his own mind).
40. Courts also award injunctive relief, the limits of which need not be
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fuses to do even that much.41 Likewise, when a civil or crimi-
nal defendant turns out to have been the good guy, she is vindi-
cated only after suffering the ordeal of litigation.
3. The Narrator
The author of an opinion, although obliged to tell a moral
tale, can often sway the reader's sympathies by choosing the
point of view and even the genre of that tale. Criminal proce-
dure cases provide the most familiar example. A judge deciding
to uphold a conviction will tell a detective story, as seen from
the point of view of the detective who ultimately succeeds in
tracking down proof of guilt. A judge deciding to reverse will
tell a tale more closely resembling Kafka's The Trial,42 seen
from the point of view of the defendant who has been manipu-
lated into confessing. Sometimes, both judges write in the
same case. 43 One can even find an occasional opinion adopting
the perspective of the main witness. 4
An opinion's author is a peculiar kind of narrator-on the
one hand claiming to be an objective observer of a dispute that
does not involve him, on the other becoming the decisive actor
in that dispute by issuing an order to end it. Literature offers
many examples of both involved narrators 45 and of relatively
discussed here.
41. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-53 (1946) (stating that
courts cannot remedy vote dilution); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486-88
(1903) (explaining the court's inability to remedy massive voting discrimina-
tion); Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 510-12 (7th Cir. 1996)
(explaining the federal courts' inability to remedy abuse in a class action claim
from a state court).
42. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. 1947) (1914).
43. E.g., Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 335 N.E.2d 660 (Mass. 1975) (com-
pare the opinion of the Court with Justice Kaplan's dissent); see ROBIN WEST,
NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 419-36 (1993) (contrasting narratives of the
crime by judges upholding penalties with emphasis on rights by others).
There are different ways of stating the facts. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, su-
pra note 25, at 77-109 (analyzing Justice Scalia's approach to the facts in an
individual case); David Ray Papke & Kathleen H. McManus, Narrative and
the Appellate Opinion, in 23 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 449 (1999).
44. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 971 P.2d 618 (Cal. 1999); see David
Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152
(1989) (discussing the Court's assumption of the viewpoint of governmental
authorities in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)).
45. E.g., CHARLOTTE BRONTE, JANE EYRE (Oxford Univ. Press 1938)
(1846); GIACOMO CASANOVA, HISTORY OF MY LIFE (Willard R. Trask trans.,
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1966) (first published in its entirety in 1960);
FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND (Robert G. Durgy ed.,
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uninvolved ones,46 but I cannot recall an example of one who
shifts from one to the other. In literature, such a dramatic
change of role might impair the narrative's credibility-
although some authors set out to do just that. In law, the nar-
rator's two roles encapsulate a fundamental conflict of adjudi-
cation: Judges exercise power, but often claim that they make
no choices but merely apply law to facts.
Although the judge delivering an opinion is its primary
narrator, sometimes that judge introduces another narrator.
The secondary narrator may be the trial judge who composed
findings of fact: "the District Court found that.. . ." Some-
times, when a court bases its judgment on the pleadings, a
party or a party's lawyer becomes a narrator: "the plaintiff al-
leges that.. .. " When the court considers a motion for sum-
mary judgment, the story is pieced together out of affidavits
submitted by one or several parties. Occasionally, an opinion
does not put the story together at all, but simply recites what
each witness said.47
Like the author of a novel, the opinion's author may let
these additional narrators speak for themselves by quoting,
paraphrasing, or summarizing their statements, or even tem-
porarily assuming their points of view. When novelists do this,
it is usually to help readers share the perceptions and the feel-
ings of the story's characters. Judges are more likely to use
secondary narrators to distance themselves and their readers,
implying that what a party alleges is not necessarily what hap-
pened. Alternatively, the court may simply accept a secondary
narrator's story as the set of facts on which the court must pass
judgment in a procedural context such as a motion to dismiss a
complaint. The unschooled reader may not then notice that the
"facts" the court discusses emerge from a complex process of
construction.
The most extraordinary way in which judges writing opin-
ions use a secondary narrator to construct the factual narrative
occurs when the case has been tried by a jury. A jury rarely
says what facts it has found. (In a criminal case, a judge is for-
bidden to ask it to do so. 48 ) So the court simply assumes that
Serge Shishkoff trans., Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1969) (1864). Almost all mem-
oirs have involved narrators.
46. E.g., WILLA CATHER, MY ANTONIA (1988); THOMAS MANN, DOCTOR
FAUsTUS (H.T. Lowe-Porter trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1948) (1947).
47. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 684 N.E.2d 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
48. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969).
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the jury found the set of facts most favorable to the prevailing
party that is consistent with the evidence and with the judge's
instructions. This mechanical system for writing a story recalls
experimental fiction in which the course of the plot is decided
by the reader's choice or by random selection.49
Judicial authors rarely explore some of the other narrative
options that literary theorists have analyzed. The narrator
does not claim omniscience-unlike some novelists and trial
lawyers, judges do not profess to know the undisclosed
thoughts of their characters-and never admits that he is mak-
ing up the story and could change it, except by deciding what
remedy to award after the story ends. Rarely will the judge
mention anything seen outside the courtroom. 50 No judge will
set out to be what students of literature call an "unreliable nar-
rator," one whose readers will doubt his words.51 On the con-
trary, making oneself credible is a prime goal of judicial rheto-
ric.52 Sometimes, however, a judge unintentionally becomes an
unreliable narrator because his language reveals bias or ne-
glect.53
49. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 769-70 (5th ed. 2001);
see, e.g., JULIO CORTAZAR, HOPSCOTCH (Gregory Rabassa trans., Pantheon
Books 1966) (1963) (two alternative sequences of chapters); JOHN FOWLES,
THE FRENCH LIEUTENANTS WOMAN (1969) (two alternative endings). Fran-
cois Rabelais of course described a judge's use of dice to decide cases in Gar-
gantua and Pantagruel. FRANCOIS RABELAIS, GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL,
bk. III, chs. 39-44 (J.M. Cohen trans., Penguin Books 1955) (1534, 1532).
50. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(a) (1999) (re-
quiring a judge with personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts to with-
draw). But see In re State Bar, 485 N.W.2d 225, 227-29 (Wis. 1992) (per cu-
riam) (Bablitch, J., concurring) (describing his own experiences); JOHN W.
STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 216, at 26 (5th ed. 1999) (discuss-
ing the evidentiary status of a "view" taken by a jury or judge).
51. WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION 211 (1961). For clear
examples, see CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE YELLOW WALLPAPER (1973);
KAZUO ISHIGURO, THE REMAINS OF THE DAY (1989); WILLIAM MAKEPEACE
THACKERAY, THE MEMOIRS OF BARRY LYNDON, ESQ. (Univ. of Neb. Press
1962) (1844).
52. E.g., Levinson, supra note 5; see infra Part uI.A. But see Republic of
Bolivia v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (judge
professing ignorance to be humorous).
53. E.g., Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp.
667 (S.D. Ga. 1963) (upholding school segregation), rev'd, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964), remanded to 255 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D.
Ga. 1965); Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LMIS 641, at *30-31
(Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) (resolving a frozen embryo dispute on the basis
of findings about when life originates), rev'd, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIs 642, at
*7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990). For more discussion of the frozen embryo
dispute, see Colb, supra note 12, at 117-25.
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Perhaps to bolster an air of straightforward reliability, ju-
dicial story-tellers omit some tricks of the narrative art (which,
of course, can itself be considered a trick). They usually tell
their story from beginning to end, with few flashbacks or later
revelations about previous incidents, although a complicated
tale may be broken into separate narratives. 54 Often, they tell
it several times, with varying detail and emphasis, somewhat
like Wagner's Ring of the Nibelungen, but at lesser length.
There is little dialogue, except when the content of a discussion
is crucial, and not much background material, unless the mat-
ter in dispute prompts the judge to wax expansive. 55 The style
often aspires to the plain mode of Defoe and Hemingway, albeit
in a clumsier and more polysyllabic version. But any genre has
its conventions and, as Gerald Wetlaufer has explained, a cen-
tral feature of judicial rhetoric and other legal rhetoric is the
denial that it is rhetorical. 56 Despite these conventions, how-
ever, a judge occasionally succeeds in writing a factual narra-
tive that might entertain even a non-lawyer, for example the
tales of eighteenth-century England told by Sir William Scott
(later Lord Stowell).57
4. The Characters
The characters who appear in judicial opinions are more
54. E.g., Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974) (describ-
ing separately segregative acts in different parts of a school system), affd, 509
F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974). For examples of flashbacks, see United States v.
Peed, 714 F.2d 7, 8 (4th Cir. 1983), and Eight Hundred Corp. v. 217 State
Street Realty Corp., 565 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (App. Div. 1991) (mem.). For some
of the possible narrative techniques rarely found in judicial opinions, see
GPRARD GENETrE, NARRATIVE DIscouRsE: AN ESSAY IN METHOD (Jane E.
Lewin trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1980) (1972).
55. E.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2454-55 (2001) (de-
scribing the history of a town in which a Takings Clause case arose); Farmer
v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1993) (detailing the history of a plaintiffs
trans-sexuality, when the issue was whether the trial court should have ap-
pointed counsel).
56. Wetlaufer, supra note 5, at 1555. But cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 421-29 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (giving flowery description of
history and significance of the flag).
57. E.g., Evans v. Evans, 161 Eng. Rep. 466, 468 (Consistory Ct. London
1790). This is a tale, told by a sexist narrator, of a couple who married in In-
dia and quarreled in England, and featuring a French governess who testified
"in the style.., of a French novel." Id. at 482. Case narratives became popu-
lar reading in eighteenth-century France, but they were briefs rather than ju-
dicial decisions. See SARAH MAzA, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS: THE
CAUSES CtLkBRES OF PREREVOLUTIONARY FRANCE (1993).
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like those in fables, epics and newspaper articles than they are
like the characters of Henry James or Dostoevsky. The limited
information available about them, the tendency of lawyers and
judges to think about litigants in familiar and therefore plausi-
ble stereotypes, the drive to justify the decision by justifying or
condemning a party's acts, and the hope that decisions will es-
tablish models for future behavior lead to the prevalence of
two-dimensional figures.58 That would scarcely surprise novel-
ists who, for both artistic and competitive reasons, delight to
show how the judicial process fails to perceive the complex
truth about individuals. 59
Even when an issue calls for psychological subtlety, the
court is more likely to respond by elucidating the law than by
analyzing an individual.60 Criminal trials often raise issues
about a defendant's state of mind, but those issues are usually
resolved by a jury and do not get into opinions. Things might
be different in countries where judges hear criminal cases and
are expected to write findings of fact.61
Yet we should not be too quick to dismiss legal characters
as mere John or Jane Does, feeble copies of their literary coun-
terparts. Am6lie Oksenberg Rorty even suggests that law and
drama share the credit for the invention of personhood. "The
idea of a person is the idea of a unified center of choice and ac-
tion, the unit of legal and theological responsibility."62 The per-
58. See E.M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL 103-18 (1927) (discussing
two and three dimensional characters).
59. See, e.g., ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Matthew Ward trans., Al-
fred A. Knopf, Inc. 1988) (1942); FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS
KARAMAZOV (Ralph E. Matlaw ed., Constance Garnett trans., W.W. Norton &
Co. 1976) (1880); ANTHONY TROLLOPE, ORLEY FARM (Oxford Univ. Press 1935)
(1862); RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940); see also Jan-Melissa Schramm,
Is Literature More Ethical than Law? Fitzjames Stephen and Literary Re-
sponses to the Advent of Full Legal Representation for Felons, in LAW AND
LITERATURE, supra note 6, at 417, 418 (arguing that Dickens and others
sought to establish their own reputability by criticizing lawyers).
60. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (discussing
mixed motives in an employment discrimination case); United States v. Allen
J., 127 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing the competence of a thirteen
year old with a learning disability to testify); State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506,
518-19 (Tenn. 1989) (discussing a multiple personality disorder claim in a
criminal defense); Peter Brooks, Law, Therapy, Culture, 13 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 227 (2001).
61. E.g., Sari Bashi, Netanyahu Ally Guilty of Bribery, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 18, 1999, at A2 (mentioning a 917 page opinion in an Israeli criminal
case tried by three judges).
62. AMtLIE OKSENBERG RORTY, Character, Persons, Selves, Individuals,
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sonages in legal opinions lack the subtlety and color of those in
many novels, but they have the essentials of individual person-
hood. They intend, act, suffer, and must answer for their be-
havior. Here again, it may be more than a coincidence that the
English novel arose during the same period as English judicial
opinions with developed statements of facts.
5. Texts Within Texts
The use of texts within texts is a traditional technique of
fiction 63 that often appears in judicial opinions. Sometimes, it
involves no more than including in the statement of facts ex-
cerpts from a document, part of the examination of a witness,
or findings of a trial court. Sometimes, the dispute itself con-
cerns stories, as when a plaintiff claims that the defendant has
published a work that libels him or infringes his copyright.
The judge's narrative must then include or describe the offend-
ing text.6 4 In a suit for legal malpractice committed in a previ-
ous action, or a suit for wrongful use of civil proceedings, the
court's narrative may include findings made in the previous ac-
tion, creating a statement of facts within a statement of facts.
65
Although not all statements of facts contain embedded
texts, they are themselves embedded in a larger text: the judi-
in MIND IN ACTION: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 78, 85 (1988) (distin-
guishing, however, characters from persons).
63. E.g., THE ARABIAN NIGHTS OR THE BOOK OF A THOUSAND AND ONE
NIGHTS (Richard F. Burton trans., Blue Ribbon Books, Inc. 1932) (Shahrazad
tells stories to the King); CHODERLOS DE LACLOS, LES LIAIsONS DANGEREUSES
(P.W.K. Stone trans., Penguin Books 1961) (1782) (epistolary novel composed
of letters among characters); WILLIAMl SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S
DREAI (play within play). Sometimes, legal texts are imbedded in fictions.
E.g., WILLIM GADDIS, A FROLIC OF HIS OWN (1994) (parodies of legal docu-
ments); HERIAN MELVILLE, BENITO CERENO (1856) (deposition).
64. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1974) (describ-
ing the events that precipitated a defamation suit); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 49-53 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.) (comparing sev-
eral different works in a copyright case); see Anthony Bradney, Reading Blas-
phemy: The Necessity for Literary Analysis in Legal Scholarship, in LAW AND
LITERATURE, supra note 6, at 533.
65. E.g., In re Hayes, 183 F.3d 162, 164-66 (2d Cir. 1999) (considering
whether a lawyer's duty to return an excessive fee, as adjudicated in previous
case, is dischargeable in bankruptcy); Armstrong v. Adams, 283 P. 871 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1929) (considering alleged legal malpractice in a previous case
in which the judge made findings); see Transcroft, Inc. v. Galvin, Stalmack,
Kirschner & Clark, 39 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 1994) (considering the admissibility
of a transcript of a previous case in a legal malpractice suit). On the signifi-
cance of the statement of facts in a judicial opinion, see supra Part I.A.1. For
more on texts within texts, see infra Part I.C.
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cial opinion itself. When a story is thus inserted in a discussion
of law, the juxtaposition modifies each of them. Some literary
fictions likewise include essay-like material. 66 The closest par-
allel to this feature of opinions comes from the Old Testament,
which likewise contains both stories and legal rulings, each of
which can be considered a commentary on the other.67 The
Book of Ruth, for example, alludes to laws laid down elsewhere
about the conversion of Moabites and the duty to marry a de-
ceased brother's wife, and itself became a source for the Jewish
laws of conversion. 68
As this example shows, influence can run both ways: Laws
can inspire stories, and stories can lead to laws. 69 Within a le-
gal opinion, only the second process is supposed to operate:
Judges have some leeway in shaping the law to provide the best
response to the history before them, but should not rewrite the
facts so as to match the law. Yet the law does affect the way in
which judges and readers perceive disputes; and a decision in
one case can influence behavior in the world outside that be-
comes the occasion of another case.
B. WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN
Judges tell some stories that are frankly fictional. Some-
times they imagine what a civil defendant might have done
other than what she did. How, for example, can one show that
a defendant was negligent except by describing a safer course
that she failed to follow and that would have avoided the in-
jury?70 Once negligence has been shown, the plaintiff may re-
66. E.g., HERMANN BROCH, THE SLEEPWALKERS (Willa & Edwin Muir
trans., Vintage Books 1st ed. 1996) (1945); LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE,
Epilogue, pt. II (Rosemary Edmonds trans., Greenwich House 1982) (1868).
67. See NORTHROP FRYE, THE GREAT CODE: THE BIBLE AND LITERATURE
(1982); see also works cited infra note 69.
68. See D.R.G. BEATTIE, THE JEWISH EXEGESIS OF THE BOOK OF RUTH
(1977). Compare Ruth 1:11-17, 4:9-11, with Deuteronomy 23:3-8, 25:5-10, and
The Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 47b. This connection between law and sto-
ries continues in later Jewish writing. See, e.g., JACOB NEUSNER, JUDAISM
AND STORY: THE EVIDENCE OF THE FATHERS ACCORDING TO RABBI NATHAN
(1992); ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL TALMUD 251-58 (Chaya Galai
trans., Basic Books, Inc. 1976) (1976).
69. E.g., CALUM CARMICHAEL, THE SPIRIT OF BIBLICAL LAW (1996) (argu-
ing that interpretation of Old Testament laws requires an understanding of
the historical narratives that inspired biblical lawgivers); DAVID DAUBE, THE
EXODUS PATTERN IN THE BIBLE (1963) (agnostic as to whether the exodus nar-
rative inspired laws about liberating slaves or was influenced by them).
70. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 297-304 (1985); James A.
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sort to fiction once more in proving damages, conjuring up the
life he would have led but for the injury,71 and prognosticating
what psychiatric care he will need ten years after the trial.72
The defendant may rejoin that different behavior by the plain-
tiff would have avoided the injury or mitigated the damages or,
alternatively, that the plaintiff would have suffered the same
injury even had the defendant acted otherwise.73
When judges tell tales of this sort, at least three kinds of
story may result. The first is a fantasy, based on someone's
imagination of how a party would have behaved in other cir-
cumstances, filtered through a judge or jury's sense of plausibil-
ity and narrative coherence. 74 (Perhaps lawyers contesting
these cases should call novelists as expert witnesses.) The sec-
ond is a tale of human averages-something like a fiction
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product
Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867 (1998); see also Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Ore. 1978).
71. E.g., Feldman v. Alleghany Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1281-87
(D. Conn. 1974) (describing in detail what would have been the plaintiffs legal
career), affd in part and rev'd in part, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975); see, e.g.,
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (holding that courts
should bring about the racial composition schools would have had but for
unconstitutional segregation); John Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty, 61
B.U. L. REV. 132 (1981) (discussing the problems of putting plaintiffs where
they would have been but for the violation); Robert N. Strassfeld, If...
Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339 (1992).
72. E.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 368-69 (6th Cir.
1978).
73. E.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995)
(limiting relief for employee who defendant discriminated against when the
defendant showed that it would have legally discharged him if the defendant
had known of employee wrongdoing); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that when the discharge of a teacher
was influenced by the teacher's exercise of free speech,the court should deny
reinstatement if the defendant shows the teacher would have been discharged
in any event); Young v. Heekin Canning Co., 681 S.W.2d 419 (Ark. Ct. App.
1985) (denying workers' compensation for a heart attack on the job that would
have occurred the same day in any event); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280,
1283 (Pa. 1978) (discussing proof that a patient might have survived had there
been no medical malpractice); cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1983) (admit-
ting evidence that the police would have discovered even had there been no
constitutional violation); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980) (re-
quiring personal injury damages for lost earnings be reduced by the taxes
worker would have paid had he continued to earn).
74. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367-71
(1977) (discussing how the court should decide who would have been hired but
for the employer's hiring discrimination); Frankel v. United States, 321 F.
Supp. 1331, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (hypothesizing a victim's potential artistic
career and likelihood of marriage).
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whose characters are portrayed as identical, machinelike, or at
least fumgible-in which the court relies on statistics and ex-
pert testimony to describe the usual fate of those in a party's
situation.75 The third is a kind of utopian fiction, conjuring up
a world in which people behave according to law. (Perhaps it
should be called Restatementland.) In legal malpractice cases,
for example, juries are invited to decide how a reasonable judge
would have decided had the allegedly delinquent lawyer pre-
sented a client's claims properly. Introducing evidence of the
idiosyncrasies of the particular judge before whom the case was
pending is too upsetting to contemplate. 76 The reasonable per-
son whose imagined behavior constitutes the standard of care
in negligence cases reflects a similar idealization.
One can easily see as hypothetical fictions statements of
fact that purport to narrate what actually happened to real
persons. When witnesses disagree, or when their testimony
supports more than one inference about what happened, what
the judge recounts is a story about how the people in question
would most probably have behaved, given what is known about
them and the circumstances. This story can be based on direct
evidence of their acts and character-although evidence law
discourages character evidence77-and on knowledge of how
people do or should behave. Much of that knowledge is itself
based on fictions-spoken, written, or seen in movies or on
television-that shape our expectations of human behavior and
provide scenarios to which lawyers appeal in shaping and pre-
senting their claims.78 Often, of course, opposing lawyers in-
75. E.g., Oldham v. Korean Air Lines Co., 127 F.3d 43, 51-54 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (predicting what a stockbroker would have earned and left to his chil-
dren had he survived); see Edwin B. Wainscott, Note, Computation of Lost Fu-
ture Earnings in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions, 11 IND. L. REV.
647 (1978).
76. E.g., Justice v. Carter, 972 F.2d 951, 956-57 (8th Cir. 1992) (asserting
that juries may not consider the behavior and thought of a particular judge in
an earlier related case but only what the judge would have decided); Phillips v.
Clancy, 733 P.2d 300, 303-06 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting an administrative
judge's affidavit about how he would have decided the matter); see Michael C.
Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 651 (1995) (discuss-
ing problems of predicting state court rulings under Erie doctrine).
77. FED. R. EVID. 404-05, 412-15, 608-09.
78. See, e.g., LAURA HANFT KOROBKIN, CRIMINAL CONVERSATIONS:
SENIMENTALITY AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY LEGAL STORIES OF ADULTERY
(1998); Philip N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influences Upon a De-
fendant's Closing Argument to a Jury, 18 VT. L. REV. 721 (1994).
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voke competing scenarios. 79 The reader (or the spectator, for
these invocations often occur during trials) must then compare
the evidence to two stories of what might have been, somewhat
like the author of a novel that holds the reader in suspense by
presenting differing versions of what is happening.80
The stories lawyers invoke often derive from previous judi-
cial opinions: They are paradigms of such legal notions as form-
ing a contract or causing an injury. Such paradigms are stories
of how people behave, but they are also stories of what the law
will accept as falling within its categories. They lurk behind
the facts of the present case as templates that the facts may or
may not fit. Does the correspondence between the parties suffi-
ciently resemble the paradigmatic exchange of offer and accep-
tance to be treated as forming a contract, for example, or is it
more like inconclusive bargaining? 81 When a court relies on
such paradigms, it compares what it assumes actually hap-
pened to a story of what might have been, and to what has oc-
curred in other cases. Of course, the law uses such stories be-
cause (among other reasons) people believe they reflect what
actually happens.82 The stories then influence the perceptions
of judges and lawyers of what happened in the cases they con-
front.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
1. Separating Facts and Proceedings
In real life, disputes merge into the litigation to which they
lead. Such activities as stating and contesting claims, hunting
for evidence, and discussing settlements occur both before and
after court proceedings start. Students of dispute resolution
see no clear boundary between life and litigation.83 Novelists
79. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN,
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN
AMERICAN CULTURE (1981); ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL
(1999); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); JANET MALCOLM, THE
CRIME OF SHEILA MCGOUGH (1999); Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz,
An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992).
80. Compare HENRY JAMES, THE TURN OF THE SCREW (LeRoy Phillips
1915) (1898) (in which the ambivalence is not resolved), with HENRY JAMES,
THE AMBASSADORS (1903) (in which it is).
81. E.g., Roth v. Malson, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 226, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
82. See KARL N. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 44, 122-26, 268-77 (1960).
83. E.g., THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (Laura Nader &
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as well portray characters and their relationships as continuing
to evolve during their litigation 4 or criminal prosecution. 85
Judicial opinions, however, usually state separately the
procedural course of the litigation and the facts out of which it
arises. Often, they reverse chronological order by describing
the proceedings first. Occasionally, when only a procedural is-
sue is before the court, or when an opinion writer wants to em-
phasize such an issue, the opinion describes its development
but says virtually nothing of the underlying dispute.86 In one
recent opinion, Justice Breyer replaced the actual facts of the
case with an elaborate hypothetical, either because he is a for-
mer law teacher or because he thought the hypothetical posed
the issue before the Court more clearly than mere reality.87
The opposite approach of stating the facts but omitting the pro-
cedural history is scarcely possible: Some sort of procedural
frame is needed to identify what the court has been asked to do.
Separate treatment of facts and proceedings carries a com-
plex, contradictory message about their connection. On the one
hand, it displays the legal system's ideal that, once a dispute
comes to court, its resolution should be based entirely on the
facts and the law, with lawyers, judges, and procedures serving
only to present facts and law for decision. What happened in
the court system should therefore not contaminate the result.
On the other hand, stating the proceedings separately empha-
sizes their importance and makes it clear that issues for deci-
sion do not simply appear in court but must be shaped and pre-
sented through proceedings that are often long and contentious.
The more practical reason for stating a case's procedural
Harry F. Todd, Jr. eds., 1978).
84. E.g., GADDIS, supra note 63; BEAUMARCHAIS, FIGARO'S MARRIAGE, in
THE MISANTHROPE AND OTHER FRENCH CLASSICS: FOUR PLAYS 187 (Eric
Bentley ed., 1989).
85. See, e.g., works cited supra note 59. Of course, there are exceptions.
In Kafka's The Trial there is a prosecution but no crime, and in many detec-
tive stories court proceedings are at most an epilogue. See KAFKA, supra note
42.
86. E.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-38 (2000); McNeil
v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 174-82 (1991); see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S.
1, 4-6 (1999) (describing a defendant's misdeeds at length on the way to up-
holding his conviction, while Justice Scalia's dissent says nothing about the
facts); see also RICHARD POSNER, CARDOzO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 33-55
(1990) (comparing Cardozo's emphasis on human victim in Hynes v. New York
Central Railway, 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921), with his depersonalization of
Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)).
87. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458, 461-63 (2000).
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history separately also reflects some of this ambivalence. The
court must sometimes decide a procedural issue that purports
to be distinct from the merits-but how can a court appraise
the adequacy of the procedures without considering what issues
were to be resolved, and how likely it was that any procedural
shortcut would affect the result? Courts look more closely for
procedural error when the result seems wrong; and their recep-
tiveness to substantive claims may shrink if the appellant has
already enjoyed ample review, or may grow if the trial judge
was careless.88
Judges often use the separation of proceedings and facts to
emphasize one or the other. One example is the familiar tech-
nique of starting an opinion in a criminal appeal with a graphic
description of the crime. This practice tends to reduce the sig-
nificance of a later description of the proceedings and their al-
leged flaws.8 9 A criminal investigation can be treated either to-
gether with the crime (because it occurs before charges are
filed) or as part of the proceedings. This may affect whether
the reader sees Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues as entan-
gled with real life or as technical procedural matters.90
An opinion's statement of proceedings may function as a
vouching preamble, which validates the ensuing statement of
facts by ascribing responsibility for it to a reliable process that
the author of the opinion could not manipulate. This is like the
prefaces to some novels, in which a narrator establishes the
credibility of the following text by describing how the "actual
author" of that text wrote it and how the narrator found it.91
Alternatively, describing the proceedings may undermine
88. E.g., Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 320-22 (1990) (vacating a stay of
execution because the defendant had filed three previous habeas petitions);
Luhr Bros. v. Shepp, 157 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 1998) (employing closer scru-
tiny when the trial court adopted without change a party's proposed findings).
89. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 171-74 (1986); ROBIN
WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 419-39 (1993) (discussing the use of
this method in Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)). But see Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1940) (in which a description of the crime leads
into and strengthens a description of police investigatory excesses).
90. Compare, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300-03 (1985) (includ-
ing investigation in statement of facts), with Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143, 144-45, 153-54 (1944) (describing the crime at the outset, the investiga-
tory procedures much later).
91. E.g., VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LOLITA (1955) (in which the preface is part
of the game); JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIER'S TRAVELS, in GULLIVER'S TRAVELS
AND OTHER WRITINGS (1958).
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what follows. 92 Statements of the proceedings in fictional
works with legal settings have often portrayed the ludicrous, 93
grim,94 and combative 95 aspects of legal proceedings, as well as
their ability to explore character, morality, and the nature of
law.96 One can imagine similar procedural narratives in legal
documents, such as the briefs Beaumarchais wrote to defend
himself against charges of bribery in an earlier suit; the briefs
describe with much humor the course of that suit.97 Most judi-
cial opinions, however, treat the statement of proceedings per-
finctorily.
2. Characters
The trial judge is a central character in an appellate opin-
ion's statement of proceedings, and is also an important mem-
ber of its audience and sometimes a secondary narrator whose
findings of fact are accepted or rejected. Usually, she comes
across as worthy but bland, her name and character concealed
behind her designation as "the trial court" or "the District
Court." Occasionally, however, an opinion will go to some trou-
ble to portray her patience and wisdom 98-or to make the
reader dubious of her assertions and outraged at her arbitrari-
ness. 99 (The latter approach recalls works in which a judge try-
92. E.g., Riner v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 131 F.3d 530, 532-33 (5th Cir.
1997) (reversing on the merits a judge who acted sua sponte).
93. E.g., JOHN BARTH, THE FLOATING OPERA (1967); CHARLES DICKENS,
THE PosTHuMous PAPERS OF THE PICKWICK CLUB (Oxford Univ. Press 1969)
(1837).
94. E.g., CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Oxford Univ. Press 1975)
(1853); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE.
95. E.g., NJAL'S SAGA (Magnus Magnusson & Hermann Palsson trans.,
Penguin Books 1960). Scores of contemporary movies and television shows
also focus on the combative aspect of legal proceedings.
96. E.g., BERTOLT BRECHT, THE CAUCASIAN CHALK CIRCLE (Eric & Maja
Bentley trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1956) (1945); HERMANN MELVILLE, BILLY
BUDD, SAILOR, in BILLY BUDD, BENITO CERENO AND THE ENCHANTED ISLES
(1942).
97. BEAUMARCHAIS, Mgmoires contre Gogzman, in CEUVRES 673 (Pierre
Larthomas ed., 1988).
98. E.g., Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 300 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding
sanctions ordered by a judge who had shown patience); Carr v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 429 F.2d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 1970) (praising Judge Frank
Johnson and declining to reverse his decision).
99. E.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865-70
(1988) (chastising a judge who sought to avoid disqualification by claiming not
to have read a document, and by failing to disclose facts to the parties); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48 (1985) (noting a judge who defied precedent);
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ing a case turns out to be himself the guilty party.100) More
subtly, the opinion may pave the way for reversal by masking
the judge's role in the decision below and stressing the behavior
of the parties. The opinion will then describe what a party ar-
gues, while gliding as quickly as possible over the trial judge's
acceptance of the argument. 0 1
The court's stories may not only treat the parties as mere
argument-bearers but may also, at the option of the opinion
writer, depersonalize parties by referring to them only with
such terms as "the respondent." The role of their lawyers is
still stranger. Often the opinion does not mention them. The
court describes the lawyers' acts as though their clients had
acted, which a rhetorician would classify as a metonymy, and a
lawyer would call treating as a reality the legal fiction qui facit
per alium facit per se. This mode of description, of course,
tends to conceal the fact that courts punish clients for what are
actually the sins of their lawyers. 102 When one adds the ten-
dency of opinions to describe points advanced by lawyers as
though the trial judge had thought of them herself, the result is
that the only lawyers an opinion is likely to mention are those
whose conduct or arguments it criticizes. 103
A procedural story that does not mention the lawyers, al-
though virtually all readers know them to play an important
role in the events described, is a most unusual kind of narra-
tive. Perhaps the closest non-legal parallel would be a story in
which divine intervention is not mentioned, but in which any
religious reader sees it at work behind the scenes. The Book of
Esther is a good example: The author never names God, but
surely considers His invisible hand responsible for the lucky
circumstances that enable Esther and Mordecai to foil Haman's
Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1072-75 (7th Cir. 1985) (criticizing a judge
whose interventions deprived the defendant of the right to counsel).
100. See, e.g., ITALO CALVINO, A Judgment, in ADAM, ONE AFTERNOON AND
OTHER STORIES 133 (Archibald Colquhoun & Peggy Wright trans., Secker &
Warburg 1983); SHAKESPEARE, supra note 94; HEINRICH VON KLEIST, THE
BROKEN JUG (John T. Krumpelmann trans., Frederick Unger Publ'g Co. 1962)
(1808).
101. E.g., Linkous v. United States, 142 F.3d 271,274 (9th Cir. 1998).
102. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 628-29 (1962) (upholding
the dismissal of a case when a lawyer failed to appear at a conference); Lester
J. Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Relation, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 1120 (1968).
103. E.g., Beeson v. Smith, 893 F.2d 930, 931 (7th Cir. 1990); Pool v. Supe-
rior Court, 677 P.2d 261, 263-65 (Ariz. 1984).
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plan to annihilate the Jews. 1°4 For those who resist any com-
parison between lawyers and the divinity, another analogy
might be what has been called the unconscious of fiction-
matter lurking below the surface of a literary work, and infer-
able only by analysis of slips and hints in the text.105 That good
or bad lawyering influences the result might thus be considered
a repressed secret of many judicial opinions.
3. Endings
Another unusual feature of procedural histories-and in-
deed of statements of facts as well-is that they are often sto-
ries without real endings. Often the case is remanded for re-
trial or reconsideration, or for the shaping or implementation of
a remedy. The reader remains uncertain who, if anyone, will
live happily ever after. That can rarely be said of fictional nar-
ratives: Even when, like The Iliad, they end in the midst of
things, we usually know how the tale will end. If the author
does hint of future problems without predicting their resolu-
tion, those problems are either themselves a conclusion-what
the characters have let themselves in for-or perhaps another
story.106 Judicial opinions, by contrast, often tell stories with
sequels.
Because judicial opinions may not end cases, a statement
of proceedings has a strange relationship with the opinion in
which it appears: Although the statement is part of the opinion,
the opinion itself is part of the statement--or rather, part of the
proceedings that the statement describes. The statement's
story ends with the opinion, which prescribes what proceedings
will follow. The opinion is not just a text emerging from the ju-
dicial system, but a program controlling the system's future op-
eration.10 7 Often, indeed, the court marginalizes its orders by
104. SANDRA BETH BERG, THE BOOK OF ESTHER: MOTIFS, THEMES AND
STRUCTURE 11-13, 45-46, 104-05, 173-84 (1979). On the absence of God as a
character in the later books of the Old Testament, and the possible suggestion
to the reader that the Jews can now get on without Him, see JACK MILES,
GOD: A BIOGRAPHY (1995).
105. MICHAEL RIFFATERRE, FICTIONAL TRuTH 84-111 (1990).
106. E.g., 2 HENRY JAMES, THE PORTRAIT OF A LADY, ch. 55 (1909) (one of
several James novels with relatively open conclusions).
107. E.g., Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S.
464, 471-72 (1969) (requiring the lower court to follow a Supreme Court man-
date); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn and su-
perseded on reh'g by 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999) (considering what issues the
prior Supreme Court decision left open).
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placing them in formulaic language such as "reversed and re-
manded" or "stay of execution vacated" at the end of the opin-
ion, or even in a separate document,10 8 but no sophisticated
reader will ignore what the court has done while considering
what it has said. Auden wrote that "poetry makes nothing
happen."10 9 A court's opinion, however, intervenes in the his-
tory it describes and is therefore inescapably subject to ethical
and political judgment.110
D. LAW STORIES 111
Opinions tell stories about how law has changed over time.
Sometimes, for example, an opinion portrays the passage of leg-
islation: the problems that gave rise to it, proposals for resolv-
ing those problems, and the legislature's decision. 112 Disputes
rage about the narrative conventions for such a tale, especially
the permissibility or wisdom of resorting to legislative history.
Often, courts tell stories about the evolution of precedent. 113
Sometimes, they look beyond the law to changes in society." 4
Screws v. United States" 5 may serve as an example of
108. See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 (1973) (per curiam)
(clarifying the requirement that district court judgments must be on a sepa-
rate document).
109. W.H. AUDEN, In Memory of W.B. Yeats, in THE ENGLISH AUDEN 241,
242 (Edward Mendelsohn ed., 1977).
110. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
111. This title is stolen from LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow
eds., 1996).
112. E.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865
(1999); Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d 719 (8th Cir. 1999).
113. E.g., Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815, 821-22 (1st Cir.
1948) (analyzing eighteenth-century precedent); Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929
(Md. 1980) (explaining the growth of women's rights); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.) (discussing the growth of
products liability); see James Boyd White, Reading Texts, Reading Traditions:
African Masks and American Law, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 117 (2000) (urging
that an opinion can be understood only against the background of its precur-
sors). On the possibility of exploring the history of a single precedent, see in-
fra Part I.B.
114. E.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (changing the
spousal testimonial privilege because of developing views of women and mar-
riage) (referred to by one of my colleagues as "Burger's feminist opus"). On
judges' use of historical fictions, see generally J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levin-
son, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 987-91 (1998)
(describing stories about United States history as canonical components of
constitutional law); Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV.
871 (1986) (discussing the use of legal fiction in American law).
115. 325 U.S. 91 (1945). For background, see PAMELA BRANDWEIN,
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some possible law stories, in this instance, stories about the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. The case arose as part of a New Deal
effort to invoke the criminal provisions of the Act in order to
provide a federal remedy for lynching. A majority of the Court
upheld the Act against a constitutional vagueness challenge
but construed it narrowly. Some of the Justices, however,
sought to place the Act in its historical context, in very differ-
ent ways. For three Justices, writing in dissent, the relevant
story was one of the Act's longtime neglect as part of history's
rejection of "feverish Reconstruction days," leading to the con-
clusion that the Supreme Court should not try to revive what
they considered a long abandoned statute.116 Justice Rutledge,
concurring in the result, told a different story about how the
Act responded to white supremacist lynchings, and thus should
apply to the case before the Court and the lynching problem
generally." 7 For each of these Justices, a story about law and
history shaped, or at least supported, a reading of the Act.
1. Directions of Change
The law story an opinion tells is usually one of progress.
The path of the law is assumed to lead in the right direction, so
that the court will not go astray if it continues in that direction.
The literary analogue would perhaps be religious or socialist
fiction-or Hegelian fiction, if there is such a thing-in which
God or history brings an individual or society closer to perfec-
tion."l8 Although many in other disciplines have rejected the
nineteenth-century assumptions of inevitable evolution that
such stories seem to imply, 119 some legal scholars continue to
defend them120 and many judges apparently take them for
RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999) (describing evolving Supreme
Court characterizations of the Reconstruction era), and David Dante Troutt,
Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional Narratives in
Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18 (1999) (including a
story based on the Screws record).
116. 325 U.S. at 142 (Roberts, Frankfurter, & Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
117. See id. at 113-34 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
118. E.g., JOHN BUNYAN, THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS FROM THIS WORLD TO
THAT WHICH IS TO COME (L.B. Seeley 1801) (1641); WILLIAM MORRIS, News
From Nowhere, in THREE WORKS BY WILLIAM MORRIS 179 (1968).
119. E.g., HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY
(1959); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE (1989); JEAN-FRANQOIS
LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff
Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984) (1979).
120. See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of
474 [Vol. 86:447
20011 THE STRUCTURE OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 475
granted, at least when writing opinions. Of course, the belief
behind such a story need not be one of inevitable evolution.
The judge may assume that, because society changes, more re-
cent decisions will come closer to reflecting social reality. Or
the judge simply may accept the greater weight of more recent
precedents as a rule of law. Likewise, a judge can rely on a
statute's history out of deference to the legislature without nec-
essarily believing that the statute improves the law.
Occasionally, however, an opinion tells a story of decline, in
which a mistaken decision has involved the law in increasing
confusion or folly. Sometimes it is not too late to undo the mis-
take, so that the story has a happy ending after all, at least in
the view of its author.121 But sometimes the wrong is not
righted, either because the judge telling the story of decline
does not speak for the majority or because he does not consider
himself free to overrule established precedent.122 The result is
a tone of bitter satire not uncommon in literary portrayals of
the law123 but rare in judicial opinions, whose authors do not
like to admit in public that the law suffers from imperfections
they cannot or will not cure. The bitterness is likely to be even
greater when a dissenting opinion tells a story that is a predic-
tion of the dire results the majority's decision will produce, for
then the judge's imagination need not be constrained by real-
ity.12 4
One can imagine, but will not find in real opinions, a story
Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Com-
mon Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53-56 (1977).
121. E.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling bad prece-
dent). Justice Brandeis was less successful in Louis K Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 548-62 (1933) (dissenting opinion) (describing the development of
large corporations and the law's failure to control their dangers).
122. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing death penalty cases); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 487
(1948) (declining to overrule an evidentiary rule because law is too irrational
for a court to disentangle); McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 524 (1857) (de-
nouncing Field Code of civil procedure).
123. E.g., DICKENS, supra note 94; HEINRICH VON KLEIST, Michael Kohl-
haas: From an Old Chronicle, in THE MARQUISE OF 0- AND OTHER STORIES
(Martin Greenberg trans., Criterion Books 1960).
124. "Loss of reputation for honorable dealing will bring us unending hu-
miliation; the impending legal and moral chaos is appalling...." Perry v.
United States, 294 U.S. 330, 381 (1935) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Justice
McReynolds, delivering this dissent in court, also predicted that "anarchy and
despotism are at the door," but that does not appear in the published opinion.
3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 2031 (Leon Fried-
man & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
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of more general decline, in which the law as a whole degener-
ates and the older precedents or statutes are usually the best.
Novelists and historians have written such stories, but even the
most conservative judges do not go that far.125 To do so would
risk collision with the law of precedent, which, even while re-
quiring judges to look to the past for authority, usually makes
the most recent past decision more authoritative than its pre-
cursors. 126 That law is indeed ambivalent, allowing a judge
some choice between revering an old precedent as embodying
basic principles of the law and rejecting it as quaint and out-
moded.127 Nevertheless, a judge bound by the law of precedent,
but embracing a history of general decline, would find himself
obliged to render frequent decisions that, according to his own
belief, diverged from superior ancient views.
Principles of judicial propriety, like the principles of tradi-
tional fiction, likewise discourage stories of random legal
change that lack overall direction. Ronald Dworkin's compari-
son of the judge's task to a novelist's adding a new chapter to a
novel commenced by others suggests that law and literature
share a concern with continuity with the past. 128 Judges should
try to keep the law on a coherent path just as novelists seek
narrative coherence, although a novelist is freer than a judge to
flout tradition. A judge may portray a past decision as a mis-
step not to be repeated, 129 but must still try to maintain a dis-
tinction between law and chaos. At most, he may describe a
"tension" in the course of decision, usually by way of argument
for a solution meant to recognize and reconcile competing poli-
125. Compare, e.g., GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, SENTIMENTAL EDUCATION (Robert
Baldick trans., Penguin Books 1964) (1869), and CHINUA ACHEBE, THINGS
FALL APART (1969) and EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (J.B. Bury ed., Methven & Co. 1900) (1776), with
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (main-
taining that procedural due process protections do not grow, but admitting
that they can shrink). But see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION
AND THE FEUDAL LAW (1957) (describing sixteenth- through eighteenth-
century appeals to the virtues of the supposed Anglo-Saxon Constitution).
126. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL
PRECEDENTS, OR THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 90-97 (1912).
127. E.g., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 689 (1999) (Justice Scalia criticizing the dissent for relying
on an "anomalous and severely undermined decision" from the 1960s, rather
than "a venerable precedent.., embedded within our legal system for over a
century").
128. RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE 228-38 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dis-
sent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998).
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An opinion need not tell a story in which law evolves
through time. It can also disregard the dates of precedents or
statutes, using what fashionable theory calls a synchronic
rather than a diachronic approach. Judges who write such
opinions know that the law changes, but more or less con-
sciously reject use of that knowledge to resolve the dispute be-
fore them, limiting themselves to other tools such as logic and
policy to organize the relevant authorities. 131 A rough literary
equivalent might be a fantastic or postmodern tale bringing to-
gether real and fictional people and events from different eras,
although these stories are likely to maintain chronological se-
quence within their own time frames. 132 The author of such a
tale is likely to play on the reader's awareness of the anachro-
nism, however, unlike a synchronic judge who hopes that read-
ers will not notice the dates of the relevant authorities.
2. Voices From the Past
When an opinion does tell a law story, the main character
is likely to be the law itself, working itself pure or failing to do
so. A slightly more human personification, the legislature, may
also make an appearance. And then there are the judges of
times past, returning in a variety of cameo roles. The opinion
may validate a precedent by stressing that Friendly decided it,
or summon up the ghost of Holmes to warn against repeating
the errors of his own day.133 These are stock characters that
130. E.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 288 n.2 (1994) (Souter, J., con-
curring). For stories of oscillation in the law told by scholars, see Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988),
and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect
of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998).
131. See WHITE, supra note 9, at 160-75 (criticizing this approach in the
course of a discussion of United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)). For an
example involving statutes, compare Justice Breyer's diachronic opinion for
the court with Justice Kennedy's synchronic dissent in West v. Gibson, 527
U.S. 212 (1999).
132. See, e.g., JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 429-609 (Random House 1961) (1922)
(Nightown sequence); VIRGINIA WOOLF, ORLANDO: A BIOGRAPHY (1928); ef
E.L. DOCTOROW, RAGTIME (1975) (bringing together famous individuals of the
same epoch who never met).
123. E.g., Deems v. W. Maryland Ry., 231 A.2d 514, 519, 522 (Md. 1967)
(relying on Friendly); State v. Goddard, 649 S.W.2d 882, 892 (Mo. 1983) (Wel-
liver, J., dissenting) (relying on Holmes); cf Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke,
339 U.S. 470, 476 n.2 (1950) (explaining that because Brandeis wrote the pre-
vious opinion, it means what it says).
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the audience knows and loves from previous encounters. Occa-
sionally, a notoriously bad judge may be brought on stage to
frighten readers away from the course he pursued. 134
Law stories often contain texts within texts, retelling the
facts or contexts of the precedents whose courses they trace.
Often the goal is to distinguish or limit the precedent, but it
may also be to emphasize its similarity to the case at bar or to
find in it the root of a broader principle. 135 A past decision may
look very different as part of a fuller narrative than it did to the
judges who handed it down. Sometimes, of course, an opinion
abbreviates its discussion of a precedent, or reduces it to a sim-
ple citation. Readers can always retrieve the precedent's full
text, however, so that the citing opinion is a kind of hypertext,
below which other texts are accessible. This form of intertex-
tuality resembles a literary allusion that summons up a myth
or previous work with a word or two.
An opinion can do more than reread and retell the story of
a previous case: It can also add to it, rewrite it, or erase it. A
judge can reinterpret a precedent so that other lawyers and
judges will be required to follow the reinterpretation, or can
sometimes overrule it entirely. Authors of literature claim no
such power. Yet an author may succeed in replacing a previous
work or in causing future readers to see it through her eyes. 136
Richardson's Pamela will never be the same after Fielding's
Shamela, Homer's Odysseus after those of Dante and Joyce,
nor the Declaration of Independence after the Gettysburg Ad-
dress. 37 On the judicial side, rejection does not wipe an offend-
134. E.g., Donnell v. Swenson, 258 F. Supp. 317, 326 (W.D. Mo. 1966)
(mem.) (referring to Lord Jeffreys).
135. E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, Local
1889, 343 N.E.2d 278 (N.Y. 1975); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1050, 1052-53 (N.Y. 1916).
136. See HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF
POETRY (1973); T.S. ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in THE
SACRED WOOD: ESSAYS ON POETRY AND CRITICISM 42 (1920).
137. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); CLARK E. CARR,
LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: AN ADDRESS 1-4 (1909). Compare SAMUEL
RICHARDSON, PAMELA OR, VIRTUE REWARDED (Peter Sabor ed., Penguin Books
1980) (1740), with HENRY FIELDING, AN APOLOGY FOR THE LIFE OF MRS.
SHAMELA ANDREWS (Sheridan W. Baker, Jr. ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1953)
(1741), and HENRY FIELDING, THE HISTORY OF JOSEPH ANDREWS AND HIS
FRIEND MR. ABRAHAM ADAMS (1742); compare also HOMER, THE ODYSSEY
(Butcher & Lang trans., Macmillan Co. 1930), with DANTE ALIGHIERI,
INFERNO 229-33 (Elio Zappulla trans., Pantheon Books 1998), and JOYCE, su-
pra note 132.
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ing decision from the books, except sometimes in California. 138
Readers can still read it, and another court may revive it. 139
II. INTERWEAVING THE STORIES: AN EXAMPLE
Part of the judicial craft is deploying different kinds of sto-
ries in different ways. Not every opinion tells all the stories I
have discussed, and each has its own way to recount and to
blend those stories it does tell. Often, the opinion tells its sto-
ries simply and separately; but a skillful judge considering an
appropriate case can write more complex narratives. Rather
than try to list different ways of mingling stories, I will give an
example-an unusually important and well crafted one.
Lawyers remember New York Times Co. v. Sullivan140 as
the case that constitutionalized libel law. It held that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments allow a public official to recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood concerning his official con-
duct only by proving that the publisher knew the statement
was false or recklessly disregarded whether it was false or not.
Many remember it also as a decision preventing Southern de-
fenders of segregation from using state court libel suits to har-
ass Northern newspapers covering the desegregation struggle,
in this instance by publishing an advertisement seeking contri-
butions for Martin Luther King's campaign in Montgomery,
Alabama and for voting rights activities. Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court unites these two contexts for the decision
both rhetorically and intellectually through its interlocking sto-
ries.1 4 1
The opinion's statement of the case tells three stories. Af-
ter stating in general terms the issue before the Court, Justice
Brennan plunges into what, in form, appears to be a narrative
of the proceedings below.' 42 This narrative, however, is also a
138. On the California Supreme Court's power to depublish lower court
opinions, see Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication
and Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1033, 1033-34 (1993).
139. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat'l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985), limited sub silentio by
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758-60 (1999); Morrison Knudsen Corp. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 1999) (suggesting
that precedent should be rejected as inconsistent with earlier precedents).
140. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 256-64.
479
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frame for a second narrative. The procedural statement incor-
porates the facts of the case: the publication of the assertedly
defamatory advertisement and its consequences. This second
narrative in turn makes it possible for the opinion to quote
much of the advertisement, thus describing the intimidation of
peaceful civil rights protesters, and mentioning the advertise-
ment's distinguished signers. The advertisement, a text within
a text, hence evokes yet a third narrative, the dramatic history
of the Montgomery boycott and its sequels. In 1964, when the
case was decided, this context must have been fresh in many
readers' minds. 143
This interweaving of the proceedings below, the facts con-
cerning the alleged libel, and Montgomery realities continues
as the statement proceeds. Describing Commissioner Sulli-
van's contention that the advertisement referred to him allows
the Court to point out that it does not mention him by name,
and to repeat the advertisement's own allegations.144 Recount-
ing the advertisement's minor inaccuracies brings forward
what had actually happened. Students were not expelled for
demonstrating at the Capitol, but they were expelled for de-
manding service at a courthouse lunch counter; Dr. King was
not arrested seven times, but he was arrested four times; and
so forth. 145 Mentioning the plaintiffs claims of damages raises
the fact that he introduced no evidence supporting them, and
that his witnesses did not testify to believing what he claimed
the advertisement said about him.146 The Court's implication-
or should one say innuendo?-is clear: None of Commissioner
Sullivan's Montgomery acquaintances thought worse of him be-
cause of what they read in a civil rights movement advertise-
ment. Similarly, stating the facts relating to the New York
Times' alleged malice establishes that the advertisement had
been certified by A. Philip Randolph, described with some un-
derstatement as "known to the Times' Advertising Acceptabil-
ity Department as a responsible person."147
143. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING
YEARS 1954-63, at 143-205, 444-77 (1988); Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther
King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE
L.J. 999, 1016-28 (1989).
144. 376 U.S. at 258.
145. Id. at 259.
146. Id. at 260.
147. Id. For Randolph's role in the civil rights movement, see PAULA F.
PFEFFER, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH, PIONEER OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
(1990).
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These interweavings have functions far more significant
than showing that the placers of the advertisement were the
good guys and the plaintiff was not-although establishing the
context of racial injustice surely does make the opinion more
persuasive. More importantly, however, the context shows that
the libel judgment really did menace free speech about vital
public issues, so that the issue the case posed could not be re-
duced to the state courts' technicalities about whether jurors
could presume malice. 148 Readers cannot help recognizing that
the case arose from a major public controversy.
The Court's narrative also establishes the relationship be-
tween the civil rights struggle and libel law. Publishing an ad-
vertisement in the Times was an appeal to the public just as
deserving of constitutional protection as other protest activities
like demonstrating on the steps of the state Capitol or demand-
ing service at the courthouse cafeteria. By the same token, re-
covering a damage verdict from the Times was just as much an
effort to suppress critical speech as arresting or intimidating
demonstrators, expelling student protesters, and denying Afri-
can Americans the right to vote. The statement shows, more-
over, how an unreformed libel law could be used for suppres-
sion by permitting a large verdict on flimsy facts. The
conclusion is clear: Free speech about controversial matters can
be protected only by building into the law of libel some leeway
for those protesting governmental actions.
Justice Black's concurring opinion emphasizes the context
of the case even more explicitly than Justice Brennan's opinion
for the Court, and it is interesting to ask why. Justice Black,
himself an Alabama native, writes that "Montgomery is one of
the localities in which widespread hostility to desegregation
has been manifested." 149 He goes on to mention hostility to "so-
called 'outside agitators" 150 and to mention a number of similar
defamation suits pending against the Times and CBS. 151 I
doubt that this divergence arises from Justice Black's willing-
ness to go beyond the majority by forbidding altogether libel
suits against state officials arising out of their official conduct:
The logic of Justice Black's proposed rule in no way depends on
these particular facts. To some extent, the difference in narra-
148. See 376 U.S. at 262-64, 267.
149. Id. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
150. Id. (Black, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 294-95 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also mentions
these suits, but only some of them and only in a footnote. Id. at 278 n.18.
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tives may reflect a difference in style between the two Justices,
as well as the greater freedom enjoyed by the author of a con-
curring or dissenting opinion.
I suspect, however, that Justice Brennan deliberately re-
frains from tying the decision explicitly to the situation in
Montgomery in order to give it greater generality as a funda-
mental reorientation of First Amendment law.152 The context
illustrates why that reorientation is needed but does not limit
it. Justice Black, by contrast, while supporting an even more
sweeping ruling, leaves himself more open to the criticism that
he is over-reacting to a specific abuse.
As Justice Brennan proceeds to discuss the legal issues, he
introduces yet another narrative, a law story about the First
Amendment. A long quotation from Justice Brandeis's concur-
ring opinion in Whitney v. California describes the Framers'in-
tent to protect public discussion of grievances as a "political
duty." 153 Soon afterward, Justice Brennan explains how the
"great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798... first crys-
tallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the
First Amendment" as a guaranty of "free public discussion of
the stewardship of public officials."1 54 Although the opinion's
analysis contains a lot more than history, its four page discus-
sion of the Sedition Act is clearly central.155 And the story of
deepening national recognition of the importance of public criti-
cism of public servants is carried forward through a detailed
description of a 1908 Kansas case, clearly more important as a
historical marker than as a precedent binding the Supreme
Court.156
Justice Brennan's law story functions as an inspirational
narrative of how "[ifreedom slowly broadens down from prece-
152. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Cen-
tral Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 193-94.
153. 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 449 (1969) (per curiam)).
154. Id. at 275.
155. See id. at 273-76. For a discussion of the Act's relevance, see HARRY
KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 17-20 (1965).
156. See 376 U.S. at 280-82 (discussing Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281
(Kan. 1908)). Another emphasized lower court decision, this one arising from
a charge of anti-Semitism against a Congressman, implies that the need for
the principle that the Court recognizes extends beyond the civil rights struggle
in the South. See id. at 272 (discussing Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457
(D.C. Cir. 1942)).
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dent to precedent,"1 57 but it also has more direct bearings on
the case. The Sedition Act made truth a defense to the crime it
defined, so that the nation's rejection of the Act supported the
Court's requirement that libel plaintiffs who are governmental
officials must prove the falsity of an allegedly defamatory
statement. The Act's critics proclaimed that "'the censorial
power is in the people over the Government, and not in the
Government over the people,"'158 which the Court made a prem-
ise of its decision. The history of misuse of libel law by public
officials made Supreme Court reform appropriate. More
broadly, the campaign of Jefferson and Madison against the Act
was itself an example of free speech's operation to reform gov-
ernmental abuses. Implicitly, then, the story of Jefferson and
Madison parallels the story of Martin Luther King and the
Montgomery protesters.
In the final section, Justice Brennan's opinion turns from
the recognition of a rule of Constitutional law to its application,
holding that the record cannot support a verdict for the plain-
tiff.159 That application requires the Court to recount in
greater detail the story about the advertisement and its publi-
cation that it told at the outset of the opinion, this time without
describing the proceedings below. The opinion thus relates how
the Times acted in good faith in publishing the advertisement,
and how not even the plaintiffs own witnesses-whose testi-
mony is set forth in some detail-read the advertisement as re-
ferring specifically to the plaintiff Commissioner Sullivan, as
opposed to the city's government and police department in gen-
eral.
That these circumstances appear twice in the opinion
shows clearly enough that their first appearance was not sim-
ply part of a compulsory statement of the facts. One can easily
imagine an opinion opening with a short statement of the pro-
ceedings below focusing on the rules of law that the Alabama
courts applied, with the story of the advertisement postponed
to the opinion's final section. Such a statement, however,
157. ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, You Ask Me Why, in TENNYSON 45 (1985).
158. 376 U.S. at 275 (quoting James Madison).
159. See id. at 283-92. In addition to clarifying the operation of the Court's
main ruling, this discussion has also become a primary support for searching
appellate review of factual findings where First Amendment rights are at
stake. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 499 (1984); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 229, 241-44 (1985).
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would not play the multiple roles I have described. What Jus-
tice Brennan actually wrote not only plays those roles but also
sounds at the opinion's close the same theme heard at its out-
set: An official used flimsy libel claims to suppress criticism.
The Court drives its point home by holding, in its parting shot,
that the decision of the Alabama courts is tantamount to ban-
ning criticism of the government itself by groundlessly constru-
ing it as criticism of an individual official. 160
Could the New York Times opinion have been written
without telling its stories as it does? Of course it could have
been, just as it could have been written without referring to the
people's censorial function or the lower court precedents it
quotes. The Pentagon Papers case (another case involving the
New York Times) shows that a ruling can be important without
an elaborate opinion.161
Would a storyless version of the opinion in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan have been substantially the same opinion? No:
It would have been different in both content and effect. Ulti-
mately, what a Supreme Court opinion winds up deciding de-
pends to a considerable extent on how it inserts itself in the
history of the law and the nation. That is precisely what Jus-
tice Brennan's use of stories addressed and accomplished. We
can use analysis to separate from each other the stories he tells
about the Sedition Act, the Civil Rights movement, and the
First Amendment, but it will be hard for anyone who has read
his opinion to conceive of those stories as unrelated to each
other.
III. VOICES
According to one ideal, only one voice should be heard in
judicial opinions: the voice of the law. That ideal, whatever its
merit, does not correspond to reality. Even the voice of an opin-
ion's author is more complex than one might think. And an at-
tentive reader can usually hear other voices as well.
A. THE AUTHOR OF THE OPINION
1. Puzzles of Authorship
The legal voice is usually insincere. Its speaker may ex-
160. 376 U.S. at 291-92.
161. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
curiam).
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press views not his own, or may utter words written by another
as his own. The advocate is the paradigm of the first possibil-
ity: He does his best to speak with every appearance of sincer-
ity, occasionally even pretending to take on a client's or victim's
identity, 162 but in our legal system those in the know under-
stand that he vouches for neither his client nor his argu-
ments.163
The second possibility likewise has roots in advocacy:
Athenian orators, for example, wrote speeches that litigants de-
livered as their own.164 That practice is not extinct in some fo-
rums, such as congressional hearings, in which parties are ex-
pected to speak in person rather than through counsel. Similar
ventriloquism occurs, moreover, in other legal discourse. "We,
the people" did not write the Constitution; 65 testators do not
write the wills, nor contracting parties the contracts that speak
in their names; legislatures, and even legislators, do not write
statutes.
What counts in most legal writing is not authorship but
authorization. Whoever wrote the words, whoever speaks
them, and whoever believes what they say, the crucial question
is whether the person for whom the words are spoken has li-
censed their use in her behalf. The traditional view of literary
authorship is different: We often care whether the words we
read were written by Shakespeare, Bacon, an unknown Eliza-
bethan actor, or a later editor. In recent years, it has become
popular to emphasize that the concept of individual artistic
creation is a social convention, dating in important respects to
the eighteenth century, inconsistent with the facts of much lit-
erary production, and productive of mystification in an era in
162. E.g., Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 711-13 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding
misconduct when a prosecutor gave purported a narrative of the dead victim's
experience).
163. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (1984) (explaining
that a lawyer's representation is not an endorsement of the client's views or
activities); DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE
ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL TRIAL 1800-1865, at 141-42, 154-62 (1998) (tracing
the origin of the Anglo-American rule that an advocate may not purport to ex-
press his own opinion). Of course, there are limits to what a lawyer may argue
on behalf of a client. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 3.4
(1984).
164. MATTHEW R. CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN 37-38, 202-05 (1998);
see also CAIRNS, supra note 163, at 49-51 (describing a similar practice in
early nineteenth-century English felony trials).
165. U.S. Const. pmbl.
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which corporate teams put together many works. 166 Judges in
copyright cases must reckon with this problem, for example,
when they seek to identify the author or authors of a movie to
which many contributed. 167 Nevertheless, even sophisticated
readers continue to presume that a novel or poem is the expres-
sion of an individual author.168
A judicial opinion looks more like a novel than a contract in
these respects. In Anglo-American legal systems, it is usually
uttered by a single, named judge who is presumed to be its au-
thor. It is probably not a coincidence that the eighteenth cen-
tury, when modern notions of literary authorship were develop-
ing, was also when reporters began trying to record judges'
actual words, including rhetorical flourishes, rather than pro-
viding a summary of their reasons and conclusions. 169
A judge is free to write an opinion in her own style, and
thus to express to some extent her own personality. 170 Indeed,
some such self-expression is essential if the opinion is to estab-
lish its author's reliability.171 The ways of doing that vary from
judge to judge if not from opinion to opinion. Justice Holmes's
candor in avowing the choice he is making persuades us to be-
lieve his Olmstead dissent, while Chief Judge Cardozo portrays
himself in Ultramares as the slave of the law, and Justice
Brandeis's accumulation of studies and reports gives him the
authority of science and objectivity.172 Lord Denning and Judge
166. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS (1996);
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS (1993); MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE
AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET (1994); Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?,
in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE (Donald F. Bouchard & Sherry
Simon trans., 1977).
167. E.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (considering
whether an advisor was co-author of the movie Malcolm X).
168. See SUSAN LETZLER COLE, PLAYWRIGHTS IN REHEARSAL: THE
SEDUCTION OF COMPANY (2001) (describing the authority actors attribute to
authors).
169. See authorities cited infra notes 176-77. For the earlier practice, see,
for example, The Queen v. Marquis of Winchester, 76 Eng. Rep. 621 (K.B.
1583) (reported by Coke), and Earl of Inchiquin v. Fitzmaurice, 2 Eng. Rep.
603 (H.L. 1785) (reporting a House of Lords decision, at that time still ren-
dered by vote and often without opinion).
170. Scholarship is another legal genre of which this may be said.
171. See POSNER, supra note 12, at 255-302; WHITE, supra note 9, at 102-12
(discussing Justice Frankfurter's self-presentation in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952)).
172. Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 442
(N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J.), and Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504,
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Posner use a direct, informal style, while Chief Justice Mar-
shall gives the impression of neutral objectivity. 173 None of
these self-portraits, of course, necessarily coincides with its au-
thor's real character.
Although judges thus appear as authors in the traditional
literary sense, they do not always write their own opinions.
Nowadays, law clerks do much of the writing, or at least boast
of doing so. 17 4 Judges have been known to risk appellate disap-
proval by adopting, more or less verbatim, findings of fact that
one party has submitted. 175 English law reporters sometimes
suppressed opinions they found incorrect, garbled opinions in
transcription, or rewrote the opinions they claimed to report, as
Coke notoriously did. 176 One distinguished reporter simply
omitted decisions he considered "'inconsistent with former deci-
sions or recognised principles. 1 77 Supreme Court Justices ne-
gotiate the text of opinions, insisting on additions and deletions
as the price of joining in an opinion.178 Justice Holmes de-
scribed this treatment of his opinions as castration. 79
2. The Judge and the Court
Negotiation of appellate opinions makes clear that an opin-
517 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). On the other judicial voices in Olmstead,
see James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REV. 835 (1986).
173. Compare, e.g., Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 799 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Posner, C.J.), and Candler v. Crane Christmas, 1951 IKB. 164, 174 (Eng. C.A.
1951) (Denning, L.J., dissenting), with Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 375 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.).
174. WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 30-31, 39-44
(1996); see JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 52-
58 (1986) (discussing the implications of this practice).
175. E.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656
(1964).
176. See JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 65-80 (1968); James
Oldham, Detecting Non-Fiction: Sleuthing among Manuscript Case Reports for
What was Really Said, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 133 (Chantal Stebbings
ed., 1995). For similar accounts in the United States, see Craig Joyce, The
Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall
Court Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1303-12 (1985).
177. Peter Luther, Campbell, Espinasse and the sailors: text and context in
the common law, 19 LEGAL STUD. 526, 533 (1999) (quoting John Campbell, a
judicial reporter and later Lord Chancellor).
178. BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHEN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT
(1983); see also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARiSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
179. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE
INNER SELF 314 (1993); cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (up-
holding the constitutionality of sterilizing woman with asserted inherited fee-
ble-mindedness).
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ion is not simply the utterance of the judge who delivers it: It is
also the utterance of the court, at least when it is a majority
opinion of a multi-judge panel. As a result, it necessarily
speaks with more than one voice. Alternatively, one could say
that it speaks with a voice that is not necessarily the voice of
any single judge, even the one who wrote it.180 Perhaps this is
a legal equivalent of the "free indirect style" of a novel, in which
the narrator's voice sometimes merges with the thoughts of a
character without actually quoting them. 181
To the extent that an opinion speaks for a number of
judges with differing views, one could say that to consider its
purported author's sincerity becomes pointless. That author,
like a courtroom advocate, speaks on behalf of others, or rather
on behalf of a consensus that goes beyond her own views. The
impression an opinion gives of honesty and conviction may at-
test only to the writer's rhetorical ability. In the world of liter-
ary theory, of course, some would question the whole notion of
sincerity, maintaining that any writing is a social act, often
penned by an individual but bearing the traces of many people
and many utterances, and that in any event it is misleading to
speak of congruence between a work and a detailed authorial
intent distinct from and lurking behind it.182
On the other hand, because the author of an opinion is
thought to believe in the views she accepts, readers are free to
discuss her sincerity. If, for example, she uses in one opinion
views contrary to those she has stated elsewhere, we can tax
her with insincerity as well as inconsistency. We expect that,
even when a judge negotiates deletions and additions to her
opinion, there must be some limit to her willingness to sign
claims she is not prepared to honor in future cases. After all,
she remains free to concur separately or to state the majority's
views while noting her own dissent from them.183
180. For an extreme example, see Kansas v. Colorado, 121 S. Ct. 2023,
2032 n.5 (2001) (four Justices endorsing a position with which they disagree in
order to produce a majority for a judgment).
181. E.g., GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, SENTIMENTAL EDUCATION (Robert Baldick
trans., 1964); see, e.g., BAL, supra note 23, at 46-52; PETER BROOKS, READING
FOR THE PLOT 193-207 (1984).
182. See Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in THE RUSTLE OF
LANGUAGE 49 (Richard Howard trans., 1986).
183. E.g., United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 590 (2d Cir. 1999) (Judge
Noonan noting his own dissent in his own opinion). During the era in which
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court shunned dissenting opinions, an
opinion would sometimes state that "a majority of the court" had reached a
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That a judicial opinion speaks both for its deliverer and for
the court may also affect its interpretation. Should it be read
in the light of other opinions delivered by the same judge, or in
the light of other opinions delivered for the same court? Bio-
graphers have little hesitation in treating an opinion as a per-
sonal utterance;18 4 lawyers and judges are less likely to do so.
Does the author's explanation of what she said deserve special
weight? Judges usually do not say that it does in a previous
opinion, but one can find a few exceptions.1 85 One can avoid
such questions by insisting that an opinion "speaks for itself."
Still, it is hard to avoid what everyone knows: that opinions
also speak for their authors and for courts.
The double voice of judicial opinions arises in part from the
practice, introduced by Chief Justice Marshall, of entrusting to
a single judge the delivery of an opinion that, if all goes well, is
also that of the court.186 In Europe, opinions are anonymous
and taken to speak for the court as a body, although when the
court consists of a single judge a more individual reading is at
least possible. England still follows in principle the opposite
approach: Each judge delivers an opinion separately, some-
times extempore, so that one can determine the views of the
court only by adding up these individual statements. 187 Today,
however, English opinions are often written, and some of the
judges may state only that they agree with another judge's
opinion. Negotiation of the lead opinion may therefore occur,
although the secrecy of court proceedings makes it impossible
to say for sure.
certain result, tipping off readers that there were dissenters, and dissociating
the unnamed dissenters from any appearance of asserting views they in fact
repudiated. E.g., Duggan v. Rennick, 77 N.E.2d 639, 640 (Mass. 1948).
184. E.g., FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 63-138 (1999)
(tracing a consistent political philosophy in Brennan's opinions); RICHARD
POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO (1997) (relating Cardozo's
opinions to his personality).
185. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 522
(1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
562 n.10 (1972); Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459, 467 (1874)
(Field, J., dissenting). For an illuminating discussion of the implications and
development of the quest for a single opinion, see Robert Post, The Supreme
Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Deci-
sionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267 (2001).
186. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States
Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 138 (1999).
187. See SANDRA BERNS, To SPEAK AS A JUDGE: DIFFERENCE, VOICE AND
POWER 63-76, 111-24, 176-83 (1999) (comparing the opinions of different
judges in the same case).
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Yet even a one-judge court may speak with a double voice.
When, for example, a trial judge writes an opinion, the authors
of past appellate opinions can often be heard, not just in direct
quotation, but by shaping what the trial judge feels authorized
to write. The judge may occasionally criticize precedent but
will often adopt its approach and even its phraseology, whether
out of duty, decorum, fear of reversal, suggestibility, or inertia.
Even when there is no binding precedent, the voice of the law
(or the judge's perception of it) mingles with what might other-
wise have been the judge's own voice. A judge confronting an
unfamiliar problem and trying to work out what the law is and
what his own views are may find it hard to distinguish the for-
mer from the latter.188
So one could easily view judges, like other legal authors, as
paragons of inauthenticity.' 89 What could be less authentic (for
those who believe in the possibility of authenticity) than sys-
tematically referring to oneself as "the court"? Indeed, the nov-
elist Ivan Klima, portraying a judge who struggles to distin-
guish his own voice from that of the law, shows how that
struggle leads to the end of his judicial career in Communist
Czechoslovakia. 190
An opinion's double voice often addresses itself to double or
multiple hearers. An opinion speaks immediately to those in-
terested in the resolution of the case at bar: parties, their law-
yers, and lower court judges who may be called on to preside
over further proceedings. At the same time, the judge speaks
to those who will use the opinion to ascertain and understand
the law: lawyers whose clients face legal problems arguably
governed by precedent, and more broadly students, expounders
and critics of the law. Usually, judicial opinions make no ex-
plicit reference to these audiences, adopting somewhat the tone
of a voice from the heavens, as opposed to a human speaking to
humans. Occasionally, however, a judge will address more di-
rectly the bar, the scholarly community, or the general pub-
lic. 19
1
188. Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
189. Cf RIcHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE
PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FIcTION (1984) (describing as lawyers
fictional characters who use verbal complexities to avoid realities).
190. IVAN KLfMA, JUDGE ON TRIAL (A.G. Brain trans., Chatto & Windus
1991) (1986).
191. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (reading an amicus brief as an offer of cooperation from the scien-
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B. OTHER VOICES
1. Defining the Opinion's Boundaries
The judges of an appellate court, of course, may speak for
themselves, and not merely by negotiating the language of a
single opinion. They may concur or dissent separately. Doing
so at once gives the resulting multiplicity of opinions an adver-
sary character, recalling novels with several narrators. 192 Quo-
tations from opinions of the trial judge or the judges of appel-
late courts that have previously heard the case may add the
voices and differing views of those judges, at least to the extent
that an opinion quotes them or that a reader can look up their
opinions. Occasionally, a lower court judge even gets a chance
to respond to his superiors. 193
These possibilities give an appellate opinion indeterminate
boundaries. Dissents and lower court opinions are not, strictly
speaking, part of the opinion; but it is entirely legitimate for a
reader to use them to improve his understanding of the facts,
issues, or arguments. This in turn affects his reading of the
main opinions. Sometimes, for example, other opinions show
that an appellate opinion has swept under the rug problems it
should have faced. 194
In literature, comparably indeterminate texts can be found
when a novelist such as Balzac or Trollope writes a series of
tific community and urging trial judges to respond by appointing independent
expert witnesses); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958) (asserting that
state officials and legislators must follow Supreme Court desegregation prece-
dent); Agee v. Paramount Communications Inc., 114 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir.
1997) (notifying the bar of the importance of complying with the rule); Lippard
v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 505 (Mo. 1986) (en bane) (Welliver, J.,
dissenting) (urging the legislature to enact specified legislation overruling the
majority opinion), superseded by Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.765 (1987).
192. E.g., VIRGINIA WOOLF, THE WAVES (1931); WILLIAM FAULKNER, AS I
LAY DYING (Noel Polk ed., Vintage Intl 1990) (1931); LAWRENCE DURRELL,
THE ALEXANDRIA QUARTET (1961); see Orit Kamir, Judgment by Film: Socio-
Legal Functions of Rashomon, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 39, 45-56, 66-73 (2000).
193. E.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F. 3d 1311, 1315-17 (9th
Cir. 1995), on remand from 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (opinion on remand implicitly
criticizing Supreme Court decision); Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 41-45
(1st Cir. 1974) (Aldrich, J.) (defending his decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 331
F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964)), rev'd, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Stephen Reinhardt, The
Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and The Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205,
205-07 (1992) (criticizing the Supreme Court treatment of death penalty ap-
peals).
194. E.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 392-
97 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
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novels that involve the same characters but are not simply
parts of one longer work, so that readers may choose between
treating one of them as entirely independent and reading it in
the context of the others. In law as in literature, one can argue
that the more inclusive alternative is more informative and
therefore better. Yet the very fact that an appellate court
chooses not to mention matters discussed below implies that it
considers them irrelevant to its decision. Arguably, its con-
stricting view should prevail over those of lower courts and dis-
senters, at least until a later court rereads the decision in its
broader context.
How far should one go in extending the potential bounds of
an opinion? The arguments of counsel in important cases used
to be reported as fully as the court's opinion,195 and now may be
available electronically or in la' libraries. Later courts have
been known to rely on them to show what issues were before
the court, and were therefore embraced by its opinion. 196
The syllabus of every Supreme Court opinion now carries a
footnote asserting that it "constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader" but the Reporter protests too
much: Syllabi surely influence some readers' understanding of
some opinions. Overburdened researchers, for example, may
never read an opinion whose syllabus makes it seem irrelevant,
and in some jurisdictions the court does write the syllabus-at
least, the rules say so. 197 One might also include in the opinion
extrajudicial comments by judges on their own or other judges'
opinions, 198 discussions in later opinions, and the occasional
195. E.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 161-70 (1941); Proprietors
of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 427-535
(1837); Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 15-32 (Ch. 1744).
196. E.g., United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 204 & n.14
(1956); Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 568-69 (1886).
But see Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 168 (2000) (rejecting the peti-
tioner's argument that the state court should be required to consult the briefs
and record in construing Supreme Court precedent). On the exploration of a
precedent's creation, see Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J.
1311 (1999).
197. E.g., W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-111, 20-203
(1995), 60-2106(b) (1994); OHIO SUP. CT. RULES I(B); see also supra note 15.
Although it has been clear since United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906), that the Supreme Court is not responsible for
syllabi, previously that was not always the case. E.g., Burgess v. Seligman,
107 U.S. 20, 20 (1882) (syllabus).
198. E.g., WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE OPINION OF THE COURT 7-8 (1996)
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scholar's commentary that shapes the reading of an opinion.199
Historians sometimes review the record or research beyond it
in order to revive a suppressed voice.200
Ultimately, one could argue that no opinion stands by it-
self, and that the relevant text is our law (or even our history)
read as a whole.201 Even when an opinion silences voices, we
can sometimes find them elsewhere, as when the Court's opin-
ion in Romer v. Evans202 pointedly refrained from mentioning
Bowers v. Hardwick.2 3 After all, the law has long recognized
that silence can speak.2° 4 Of characters in a novel, in contrast,
we can know only what the author chooses to include. 205
(asserting that Justice Story wrote some of the notes that the Reporter ap-
pended to opinions); JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (discussing anonymous newspaper es-
says defending the decision); William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents,
37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986).
199. Thus Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,
and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967), interpreted Reit-
man v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), in a way that influenced Hunter v. Erick-
son, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), and Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457 (1982).
200. E.g., DON E. FERRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978); JOHN NOONAN,
PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW ch. 4 (1976) (on Palsgraf); Kendall Thomas,
Rouge et Noir Reread: A Popular Constitutional History of the Angelo Herndon
Case, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2599 (1992).
201. See DWORKEIN, supra note 128, at 225-75. This may also be said of
Jewish law, in which students from the compilers of the Talmud until today
have struggled to understand and if possible reconcile disputing voices. Cf
DAvID S. COLE, THE RESPONSES (1980) (unpublished play, on file with the au-
thor) (evoking a similar vision of Jewish law).
202. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
203. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
204. E.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam) (inference
from the defendant's silence); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926)
(inference from the testifying defendant's failure to testify in a previous trial);
United States v. Williams, 990 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1993) (argument from failure
to call a witness); see Shoshana Felman, A Ghost in the House of Justice: Death
and the Language of the Law, 13 YALE J.L. & HUIIAN. 241 (2001); Margaret E.
Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in
Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263
(2000).
205. There are instances in which characters in one fiction reappear in an-
other; for example, in medieval stories about the courts of King Arthur or
Charlemagne, or in TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE
DEAD (1968). See also Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fic-
tional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429, 430-37. But the reader is not
obliged to accept that all these reincarnations are "really the same person."
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2. Within the Boundaries
One can find other voices in a judicial opinion without thus
stretching its boundaries. An opinion may quote parties and
other witnesses, as well as authors of written or oral state-
ments admitted into evidence. Even the jury may speak, al-
though usually the court reconstructs its supposed findings in
the peculiar way already described. 20 6 So may judges who
wrote in previous cases but are quoted in this one, as well as
other authors. Even imaginary speakers and speeches may ap-
pear: "one might contend that.. ."; "an objective observer
would conclude that..."; "the defendant would naturally have
contradicted the statements if he did not assent to their
truth."207
Incorporating other voices in a judicial opinion may permit
a real dialogue, but may also be merely an accumulation of
quotations. "Using rhetoric, even a representation of a speaker
and his discourse of the sort one finds in prose art is possible-
but the rhetorical double-voicedness of such images is usually
not very deep... ,"208 This reflects the ambivalence of litiga-
tion, which always arises out of clashing views and concerns,
but culminates, when cases are tried, in a judicial attempt to
resolve or suppress the clash.209 An opinion's author may in-
voke the conflict in its fullness, but may also present opposing
voices in a partial and tendentious way. The latter approach
may backfire, however, if readers detect and reject the author's
partiality.
CONCLUSION
Judicial opinions tell more than one story because judicial
decisions can and should pursue more than one goal. A deci-
sion should reach a result appropriate to the facts before the
court; it should emerge from procedures adequate to develop
those facts; and it should maintain consistency with past deci-
sions while promising proper results in the future. Each of
206. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
207. The quoted words are similar to those found respectively in Ferens v.
John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1990), Liljeberg v. Health Services Ac-
quisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861, 865 (1988), and Sparf & Hansen v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 56 (1895).
208. M. M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR EssAYs 354 (Mi-
chael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., Univ. of Tex.
Press 1992) (1975) (discussing the rhetoric of courts).
209. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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these goals implies its own context, which the opinion should
set forth.
An opinion that tells accurate and persuasive stories about
its facts, procedures, and law is more likely than other opinions
to reach all three goals because telling and hearing stories is a
good way to grasp and appraise how a series of events fit to-
gether. Narrative coherence of several kinds is thus an impor-
tant judicial method. 210 It is not, of course, infallible. The sto-
ries an opinion can tell may point toward different endings, just
as the ideals that decisions should be adequate to their facts,
should emerge from fair procedures, and should apply sound
general rules, may conflict with each other. As we have seen, a
story may be told in many ways, each of which may support a
more or less different ending. Yet the fact that judges use
story-telling methods also found in literature does not merely
reflect chance, judicial manipulation, or stylistic ambition. The
different ways of telling stories embody different ways in which
people, whether they are novelists or judges, perceive and un-
derstand human events.
That many voices may infiltrate a judicial opinion likewise
promotes at least one ideal of adjudication, at least in a highly
adversarial system such as ours. Hearing all those involved in
a case is a procedural safeguard for good results as well as good
in itself.211 Incorporating their voices in an opinion helps both
the opinion's author and its reader to hear them. But there are
also countervailing pressures. Letting opposing viewpoints
have their say may discomfit the judge or, some think, under-
mine the law. Among our judges, Aesop has more followers
than Dostoevsky. Often, indeed, the most distinguished judges
are the most successful in filling their opinions with their own
voices. Nevertheless, good readers often hear other voices as
well. 212
210. For analyses of other judicial methods, see PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982), BENJAMIuN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921), and LLEWELLYN, supra note 82.
211. E.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a
Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1981); Robert S. Summers, Evalu-
ating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1974); see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE:
THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 79-121 (1995) (proposing the
reader of fiction as a model for judges).
212. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); see
Luban, supra note 44; Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expand-
ing the Possibilities of Judicial Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3, 12-18, 21-26
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The structure of judicial opinions, lastly, helps them lodge
in the reader's mind. We remember the stories of many opin-
ions, and continue to hear some of their voices. Opinions are
easier to retain than statutes and formulas. Not only do they
stay with us, but they continue to be living influences on our
thoughts and our dialogues. We test proposed rules of law
against their stories, and continue the debates they embody.
They constitute much of the experience that is the life of the
law.
(1996).
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